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Abstract: Why does codetermination exist in Germany? Law and economics theories have 
contended that if there were no legal compulsion, worker participation in corporate 
governance would be ‘virtually nonexistent’. This positive analysis, which flows from the 
‘nexus of contracts’ conception of the corporation, supports a normative argument that 
codetermination is inefficient because it is supposed that it will seldom happen voluntarily. 
After discussing competing conceptions of the corporation, as a ‘thing in itself’, and as an 
‘institution’, this article explores the development of German codetermination from the mid-
19th century to the present. It finds the inefficiency argument sits at odds with the historical 
evidence. In its very inception, the right of workers to vote for a company board of directors, 
or in work councils with a voice in dismissals, came from collective agreements. It was not 
compelled by law, but was collectively bargained between business and labour representatives. 
These ‘codetermination bargains’ were widespread. Laws then codified these models. This was 
true at the foundation of the Weimar Republic from 1918 to 1922 and, after abolition in 1933, 
again from 1945 to 1951. The foundational codetermination bargains were made because of 
two ‘Goldilocks’ conditions (conditions that were ‘just right’) which were not always seen in 
countries like the UK or US. First, inequality of bargaining power between workers and 
employers was temporarily less pronounced. Second, the trade union movement became 
united in the objective of seeking worker voice in corporate governance. As the practice of 
codetermination has been embraced by a majority of EU countries, and continues to spread, it 
is important to have an accurate positive narrative of codetermination’s economic and political 
foundations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Conventional wisdom in corporate governance suggests worker participation only 
exists because of laws that probably harm the economy. In 1979, Michael Jensen 
and William Meckling memorably wrote that without ‘fiat codetermination would 
be virtually nonexistent’, that ‘this system seldom arises out of voluntary 
arrangements’, and this suggests it is ‘less efficient than the alternatives which 
grow up and survive in a competitive environment’.1 If it was not to be held 
unconstitutional, Jensen and Meckling went on to say that codetermination could 
survive in Germany by becoming irrelevant, as shareholder interests bypassed the 
employee members of the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and dealt directly with 
the executive (Vorstand). Alternatively, Germany’s economy would grind to a halt 
like in Marshall Tito’s Yugoslavia.2 As it happened, neither of these predictions 
came true. Codetermination does have significant effects and there is no sign of 
economic Balkanisation. However, it is still common to read (admittedly more in 
English language discourse) that shareholder control ‘arises endogenously’,3 that 
codetermination would not exist without a law,4 and that because of this worker 
voice entails ‘governance externalities’.5 The trouble is, these views rest on a 
mistaken historical premise.  
This article explains how German codetermination arose through collective 
agreements, which only subsequently were codified by the law. The 
‘codetermination bargains’ is a name that signifies the collective agreements 
between business and trade unions from 1918, and then from 1945 to 1951 to 
establish work councils and give workers a vote for directors on company boards.6 
These agreements were not the product of ‘fiat’. They were made voluntarily. They 
were widespread. Consensual agreements paved the way to social consensus, and 
then the consensus was codified in law. 
The timing of these developments is significant. In those historical moments 
where the codetermination bargains were made, two ‘Goldilocks’ conditions were 
met: conditions that were ‘just right’,7 but were not always mirrored abroad. First, 
the bargaining power between employers and employees had become relatively 
                                                     
1 MC Jensen and W Meckling, ‘Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed 
Firms and Codetermination’ (1979) 52(4) Journal of Business 469, 473: ‘The fact that this system seldom 
arises out of voluntary arrangements among individuals strongly suggests that codetermination or 
industrial democracy is less efficient than the alternatives which grow up and survive in a competitive 
environment [...]’. 
2 Jensen and Meckling (1979) 52(4) Journal of Business 469, 503-504. 
3 OE Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985) 306.  
4 cf B Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (1997) 583-5, reviewing relevant literature. 
5 K Pistor, ‘Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities’, in M Blair and MJ 
Roe (eds), Employees and Corporate Governance (1999).  
6 Where employee representatives may bind what a board of directors could otherwise decide, albeit in 
specific spheres, this counts as much as ‘codetermination’ as being present on the board itself.   
7 For a fascinating account of Goldilocks and the Story of the Three Bears, see M Tatar, The Annotated 
Classic Fairy Tales (2002) 245-6. It points out that the way the ending of the story is told has changed over 
time.  
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equal. With the collapse in political power and moral authority of business after 
both world wars, German trade unions were in a good position to bargain for 
codetermination. Second, the German labour movement had become unified 
around a common objective of getting a legally binding voice at work, in return for 
their investment of labour. They got it in collective agreements before it was 
written into statute. The labour movement’s unity was not a given, because unions 
have always been committed to independence from management interests, to not 
be co-opted or dominated by the employer.8 The economic consensus that was 
reached formed the basis of the political consensus, which persists up to today. 
Because there is good historical evidence for the ‘codetermination bargain’ 
view, it becomes much more difficult to argue that codetermination ought to be 
abandoned, or watered down, or avoided. Such proposals already have difficulty 
with political legitimacy, but they probably also lack legitimacy in economic terms. 
Empirical research has produced mixed conclusions about codetermination’s 
economic efficiency.9 This reflects the politicised nature of the topic, and that 
studies sometimes find what they want to.10 Empirical research will not be dealt 
with here, but it is worth saying that in order to be meaningful, it must compare 
the consequences of codetermination with the consequences of shareholder 
monopolisation, assessed in reference to social goals like economic productivity 
and human development. But precisely while empirical findings remain mixed, it is 
very important for people who are sceptical of codetermination to retain a 
narrative that differs from what will be offered here.  
Part 2 suggests that most analyses of codetermination and corporate 
governance align with one of three conceptions of the corporation: the 
Unternehmen an sich conception; the ‘nexus of contracts’ conception; or the 
conception of the corporation as an ‘institution’. Only this third conception, 
properly understood, is truly comfortable with endorsing codetermination as a 
part of modern enterprise. This is because it sees the bargains of private actors as 
entailing power, which is exercised regardless of the legal forms of transactions. 
When the playing field is fair, it is a legitimate inspiration for legislation.  
Part 3 explains the historical evolution of German codetermination. It starts 
with the inception of the legal ideal during the 1848 revolutions, it moves to the 
implementation of board codetermination from 1918 and its demise over the 
Weimar Republic, to its abolition by the fascist dictatorship, and to its resurrection 
after World War Two. German workers are now joined by workers in a majority 
                                                     
8 See also E McGaughey, ‘British Codetermination and the Churchillian Circle’ (2014) UCL LRI Working 
Paper 2/2014. 
9 e.g. FR FitzRoy and K Kraft, ‘Economic Effects of Codetermination’ (1993) 95 Scandanavia Journal of 
Economics 365 and L Fauver and ME Fuerst, ‘Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee 
Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards’ (2006) 82 Journal of Financial Economics 
673. 
10 Some of these problems can be avoided by being transparent about methodology and data. For the 
initial findings of possibly the most comprehensive quantitative study on labour relations, including 
representation at work, see J Armour, S Deakin, P Lele and M Siems, ‘How Do Legal Rules Evolve? 
Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection’ (2009) 
57(3) American Journal of Comparative Law 579. 
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of EU countries in the right to vote for the boss. There is also plenty of 
experience with codetermined institutions, especially in pensions, across the 
Commonwealth and the United States. As different countries serve as the 
laboratories of enterprise, as the numbers and knowledge of experiments spread, 
and as the democratisation of the economic realm endures, the historical narrative 
to explain it will matter more and more.11 History shows the better view is that 
codetermination is likely to stay, and that it remains a force for progress in 
corporate governance.  
 
 
 
2. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION 
 
Before exploring the evolution of German codetermination in detail, it makes 
sense to outline three competing conceptions of ‘the corporation’. This is 
important because people have often thought of employees as external to what a 
corporation ‘is’.12 Conceptions subtly entail both positive and normative claims 
about the thing being conceived: though linguistically formulated as ‘being’, 
conceptions assert meaning. For instance, corporations might be thought as being 
owned and constituted by shareholders.13 Posed this way, labour’s claims are 
demoted, as if an irritating conceptual transplant. In contrast, if a corporation is 
conceived as ‘a combination of capital and labour’, especially if capital derives 
from labour,14 then worker participation rights acquire absolute legitimacy. 
Simplistic oppositions of ‘shareholders only’ or ‘capital and labour’ were mostly, 
and thankfully, left behind in the 19th century.15 In the 20th century, more 
sophisticated views looked not merely at the actors, but at the relativity of 
different actors’ claims through the purposes of corporate governance. This 
indicated who should have a voice, and guided an understanding of how corporate 
power became shared.  
 
                                                     
11 Those who wish to focus on the essential historical evidence may refer directly to pages 22-23 and 34-
36. To assist in refuting the argument, they could also usefully consult A Schopenhauer, Die Kunst, Recht 
zu Behalten (1831).  
12 This ultimately traces back to the Roman view of a societas pecunia-opera, where to become a member one 
had to invest capital, and investing labour was not enough.  
13 An example which seems to come close, but actually differs, is the best comparative corporate law text, 
R Kraakman, J Armour, P Davies, L Enriques, HB Hansmann, G Hertig, KJ Hopt, H Kanda, and EB 
Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law (2nd edn 2009) ch 2. This formulates the book’s third agency problem 
as existing between shareholders and a corporation’s ‘other constituencies’, often misinterpreted to be an 
agency problem between ‘the company’ and employees, or other groups.  
14  See K Marx, Das Kapital (1894) vol 3, Part IV, ch 27, for Marx’s views on the corporation. He invented 
the language of the separation of ownership and control, which was later adopted by Berle and Means.  
15 At least in reputable academic discourse. In business, it is still common to hear the rhetoric of 
‘shareholder ownership’ of the corporation. The term ‘shareowner’, which has become popular in the US, 
captures the legal position in a descriptively accurate ways, because shareholders own their shares, not the 
company.    
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(1) THE UNTERNEHMEN AN SICH 
 
The first main conception of a corporation is as a ‘thing in itself’: the Unternehmen 
an sich.16 Implicitly shareholder interests do not dominate, which potentially gives 
room for workers’ claims, depending on what is seen as being in the autonomous 
‘interests of the company’.17 The German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) adopted this conception when finding that the 
Codetermination Act 1976 was constitutional.18 It originated in 1917 with Walter 
Rathenau,19 a liberal politician who had been a supervisory board director in his 
father’s electronics company, AEG. Because the concession of the state creates a 
corporation, said Rathenau, shareholders’ interests are not all-important. 
Shareholders are often irresponsible,20 while ‘numerous’ supervisory board 
directors give ‘all their spare time freely and without special claims’.21 The 
Unternehmen an sich, run by benevolent directors, can be devoted to the ‘public 
interest’, in which workers count. Although shares were still capable of being 
privately owned and inherited, large corporations had acquired such economic 
importance that the corporation ‘in itself’ had inevitably adopted a public 
character.22  
Many difficulties of Rathenau’s theory are well known,23 but they held a basic 
appeal for those seeking a fairer economy. In 1926, John Maynard Keynes told a 
gathering at the University of Berlin that a large corporation did indeed have a 
tendency to ‘socialise itself’.24 An accomplished debater, Keynes almost certainly 
knew that if something carries an air of inevitability, this may persuade an 
audience. In retrospect Keynes was plainly wrong, because private corporations 
did not spontaneously order social improvement. Moreover, there was no 
particular reason why Rathenau should have singled out a corporation as having a 
special ‘public’ status, just because it arises through a ‘concession’ of the state. 
Every contract depends for ultimate enforcement on public law institutions, 
namely tax-funded courts. This is seen to legitimise society declining to enforce 
terms that it perceives to be unjust.25 Arguing that corporations had shifted from 
                                                     
16 The word ‘Unternehmen’ translates equally well as ‘enterprise’ (as it is used, for instance, in EU 
competition law) but was meant by Rathenau to mean the narrower sense of ‘corporation’.  
17 Known as the ‘Unternehmensinteresse’. Also, interpreted in this way by M Roth, ‘Labor and 
Comparative Corporate Governance in times of Pension Capitalism’ (2013) 18 Fordham Journal of 
Corporate and Financial Law 751, 785. 
18 Bundesverfassungsgericht (1 March 1979) BVerfGE 50, 290, 315-6. It went on to say this meant there 
was no violation of the right to property. 
19 cf O Gierke, Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts (1889) whose work led in the personification of 
associations, as really existing ‘things’. 
20 W Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen: eine geschäftliche Betrachtung (1917) 32-33. 
21 Rathenau (1917) 17. 
22 Rathenau (1917) 38-39. 
23 F Haussman, Vom Aktienwesen und Aktienrecht (1928) and see the excellent review of Rathenau and 
subsequent debate by M Gelter, ‘Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-
Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light’ (2010) Working Paper N°.165/2010, 42-57.  
24 JM Keynes, ‘The End of Laissez Faire’ (1926) Lecture at the University of Berlin. cf Rathenau (1917) 8.  
25 O Gierke, Die Soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts (1889) 14. JS Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1848) Book 
V, ch 1, §2, ‘governments do not limit their concern with contracts to a simple enforcement. They take 
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an abstract realm of ‘private’ to ‘public’ was simply unnecessary to justify 
regulation. It had more value as a rhetorical assertion.  
In fact, Rathenau himself envisaged a different tendency in the actual 
development of corporations, akin to an ‘iron law of oligarchy’.26 Rathenau 
thought the participation of shareholders in governance would gradually but 
inevitably give way to the stewardship of directors.27 German corporations did 
develop in this way, but very differently compared to Rathenau’s benevolent 
expectations. Over the 1920s, the supervisory board’s powers were inflated, they 
were packed with bank representatives, and shareholder voting rights were 
increasingly appropriated by management. By 1925, just one-fortieth of German 
capital accounted for a staggering 38.2 per cent of shareholder voting rights,28 
concentrating power even beyond the extent seen in the US during the same 
time.29 But did the ‘interests of the company’ align with the public? No. Directors 
collected board seats like boys collecting stamps, gave themselves super-
inflationary pay rises, and focused on acquiring ever more power.30 The better 
view today has become that there ‘is in fact no such thing as the company as such, 
no Ding an sich, only the applicable rules’.31 And unconstrained by rules, pursued to 
its logical conclusion, the conception of the Unternehmen an sich collapsed under the 
weight of its own ambiguity into the interests of directors. The worst of all worlds, 
it allowed a self-obsessed interest group to be enriched at everyone else’s 
expense.32  
 
(2) NEXUS OF CONTRACTS 
 
In conscious opposition to the Unternehmen an sich, the conception developed that a 
corporation is nothing more than a legal fiction concealing a nexus of contractual 
                                                                                                                                       
upon themselves to determine what contracts are fit to be enforced.’ R Hale, ‘Coercion and Distribution 
in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State’ (1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly 472. R Hale, ‘Bargaining, 
Duress and Economic Liberty’ (1943) 43 Columbia Law Review 625.  
26 cf R Michels, Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie: Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen 
Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens (1909) known as Political Parties in English. Michels posited, perfectly 
undeterred by intellectual rigour, that trade unions and social democratic parties had a tendency to 
degenerate into oligarchies. Originally a ‘syndicalist’ and pupil of Max Weber, he became disillusioned 
that a general strike did not take down government, migrated from Germany to Italy, joined Mussolini’s 
fascist party, and became an economist. For an alternative theory, based on evidence, the Webbs 
identified a tendency for people to take conscious action within unions resulting in an uneasy balance but 
one that favours internal accountability, see S Webb and B Webb, Industrial Democracy (1920) ch 1, 
‘Primitive Democracy’, 27. 
27 Rathenau (1917) 39, described further in F Neumann, Behemoth (1941) 234. It would seem, for a 
different purpose, that Neumann also regards a tendency to monopolisation of capital as inherent, but it 
seems that better view is that any such tendencies are contingent upon the governance of corporations, 
and public regulation, at least in the general kind of private enterprise. 
28 R Müller-Erzbach, Die Entartung des deutschen Aktienwesens seit der Inflationszeit (1926) 11 ff. 
29 See AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) 98-102. 
30 See part 3(3) below on ‘that second collective agreement’. 
31 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500, 507, per Lord 
Hoffmann at [10]. 
32 Berle and Means (1932) 310-312. 
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relations. In 1934 a researcher for the German Bankers’ Association, and a student 
of Berlin and Harvard named Johannes C. D. Zahn, wrote that the US economy 
had become strong because its corporate law followed two principles.33 First, the 
‘leadership principle’ entailed directors having significant autonomy over 
governance. Second, a corporation was to be seen as ‘a bundle of contractual 
relationships, between the corporation and the state, between directors and 
shareholders, between shareholders mutually’.34 On this view, the contracts by 
which people initially relate to a corporation are elevated beyond the legal concept, 
to the status of an ethical principle. All parties contracting through the corporation 
were to be regarded as equal, except for the leadership, because of its special role 
in guiding the enterprise.35 Multiple constituencies could not be represented 
because ‘division in the leadership engenders the seeds of corporate weakness’.36 
Zahn’s objective, largely achieved in the Aktiengesetz 1937,37 was to reinvent the 
corporation to conform with fascist ideology.38 This view was wholly incompatible 
with codetermination, just as it initially was with meaningful shareholder rights, or 
rights for any stakeholder except directors.  
The nexus of contracts conception evolved in a number of ways, and partially 
broke with its fascist roots. Jensen and Meckling developed the view that the role 
of corporate law was to solve the principal-agent problem existing between 
various contracting parties, but especially shareholders and directors.39 While Zahn 
                                                     
33 JCD Zahn, Wirtschaftsfu  hrertum und Vertragsethik im Neuen Aktienrecht (1934) 18-19. The title translates as 
Economic Leadership and Contractual Ethics in the New Corporate Law.  
34 F Kessler, ‘Book Review: Wirtschaftsfu  hrertum und Vertragsethik im Neuen Aktienrecht’ (1935) 83 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 393, 395. 
35 Zahn (1934) 95, ‘Wenn sich zwischen Vorstand und Aktionären ein echtes Führer-Geführten-
Verhältnis entwickelt, wird das Stimmrecht des Aktionärs sehr an Bedeutung verlieren. Zunächst einmal 
wird der Aktionär viel weniger zu sagen haben, als bisher. Er wird dies aber gar nicht als ein Opfer 
empfinden, da er der Führung vertraut.’ ‘When a genuine leader-follower relationship develops between 
the executive and shareholders, shareholder voting rights will lose virtually all meaning. The shareholder 
will have much less to say than before. But he will not feel himself to be a victim, because he will trust the 
leader.’  
36 Zahn (1934) 15, ‘Sie haben dabei richtig erkannt, daß es im gewerblichen Leben entscheidend auf die 
führernde Einzelpersönlichkeit ankommt und daß man mit der Zersplitterung der Leitung den Keim der 
Schwäche in ein Unternehmen hineinliegt.’ Referring to American business, ‘They have rightly recognised 
that in business life, that the personality of the leader is decisive and that any division of the leadership 
carries the seed of corporate weakness.’  
37 W Schubert, ‘Einleitung’ in W Schubert, W Schmid and J Regge (eds), Akademie für Deutsches Recht 1933-
1945: Protokolle der Ausschüsse (1986) Band I (Ausschuss für Aktienrecht) xlvii, who says Ernst Geßler 
credited Zahn as the leading inspiration for the shape of the Aktiengesetz 1937 regarding director election 
rules and shareholder voting rights. See also J von Hein, ‘Vom Verstandsvorsitzenden zum CEO?’ (2002) 
166 ZHR 464, 476. 
38 Zahn (1934) 11, ‘Der Sieg der nationalen Revolution hat dieser Erörterung neuen Auftrieb und zum 
Teil eine andere Richtung gegeben’. ‘The triumph of the national revolution has brought a new impetus 
and in part a different direction to this discussion’. At 93, ‘Für die deutsche Aktienrechtsreform ist eine 
Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Leitung und Aktionär in der corporation von höchsten Interesse. 
Die Entwicklung drängt dahin, die Herrschaft der Generalversammlung in der bisherigen Form zu 
beseitigen. Die Demokratie des Kapitals wird ebenso verschwinden wie die politische.’ ‘For German 
corporate law reform, an investigation of the relationship between the leadership and shareholders is of 
the highest interest. Its development compels that the dominance of the general meeting of shareholders 
in its contemporary form is to be eradicated. Democracy of capital is to disappear as it did in politics.’  
39 MC Jensen and W Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
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had receded, like the Dr Strangelove of corporate law, from academia to be a 
partner of Germany’s largest private bank,40 Jensen and Meckling extended the 
nexus of contracts to include relationships with employees, creditors and others, 
and conceptualised ‘contracts’ as economic relations generating expectations even 
if not legally binding.41 Shareholders, however, were regarded as bearing a unique 
investment risk. In this way, they converted the nexus of contracts from a director 
to a shareholder primacy model of corporate governance. Frank Easterbrook and 
Daniel Fischel also promoted shareholder primacy in a nexus of contracts, 
rationalising shareholders’ monopoly on voting rights with the idea that 
shareholders bear the residual risk of corporate insolvency.42 More recently, 
however, Stephen Bainbridge has re-married the nexus of contracts conception to 
director primacy.43 Significantly, these views now appear to have been adopted by 
the Republican appointees on the US Supreme Court.44 At no point has a nexus of 
contracts theorist envisaged ‘labour primacy’. One could imagine using a labour 
theory of value to privilege workers’ claims above others.45 But since the demise of 
the idea that workers hold any property in their work,46 and given the very 
emphasis on the nexus of contracts (not ownership inputs) that make up a firm, this 
option was always foreclosed.  
                                                     
40 Namely the Düsseldorfer C. G. Trinkaus-Bank. See the creepily sycophantic interview in 
‘Bankenfusion: Chef Kocht Selbst’ (3 January 1972) Der Spiegel. Zahn’s younger brother, Joachim, 
became the CEO of the car company, Daimler.  
41 This is not to suggest that Jensen and Meckling or the other authors drew conscious inspiration from 
Zahn’s work.  
42 F Easterbrook and D Fischel, ‘Voting in Corporate Law’ (1983) 26(2) Journal of Law and Economics 
395, 403. 
43 S Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment’ (2006) 119(6) Harvard Law 
Review 1735, 1746. To support his views Bainbridge happens to rely very similar cases to Zahn (1934) 91, 
particularly Manson v Curtis, 223 NY 313 (1918). This stands for the proposition that the board should 
remain accountable to multiple shareholders, and not be dominated by one, whereas Zahn and 
Bainbridge concluded it means the board should not be accountable. 
44 Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 US (2014) at page 18, per Alito J, ‘it is important to keep in mind 
that the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for human beings. A corporation is simply a form 
of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the 
rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated 
with a corporation in one way or another’. See also Scalia J in oral argument, page 53 of the transcript or 
52:30 in the recording, speaking on favour of: ‘Whoever controls the corporation.’ Citizens United v Federal 
Election Commission, 558 US (2010) page 8 of concurrence, referring to people giving up their rights to ‘the 
leadership’. This is not to suggest US Supreme Court members are consciously pursuing any particular 
ideology. See O Kahn-Freund, ‘Autobiographische Errinerungen an die Weimarer Republik. Ein 
Gespräch mit Wolfgang Luthardt’ [1978] Kritische Justiz 183, 194, ‘Ich habe in der Arbeit einen großer 
Fehler gemacht. Ich habe nämlich – um einmal Ihren Ausdruck zu benutzen – das politische 
Selbstverständnis der Richter überschätzt.’ Kahn-Freund, speaking in 1978 of his famous 1931 article on 
the German courts’ pursuit of a fascist social ideal, says, ‘I made a great mistake in that work. Namely – 
to use one of their expressions – I overestimated the political self-awareness of the judges.’  
45 cf J Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689) ch 5.   
46 cf W Njoya, Property at Work (2007) which argues for this idea being revitalised so far as it would extend 
to rights such as job security and worker participation, rather than a market in buying and selling one’s 
job.  
  
Ewan McGaughey                                                                             The Codetermination Bargains 
 
 9 
The nexus of contracts conception carries an intuitively appealing critique of 
the ‘reification’ or ‘anthropomorphisation’ of a corporation.47 Yet it dismisses one 
fiction only to replace it with another.48 Why is a contract any less of a ‘fiction’ 
than a corporation? In the legal mind, a contract generally arises when the social 
facts of offer, acceptance, and some quid pro quo, are exchanged in legally 
colourable contexts. In the economic mind, it is generated through the creation of 
reasonable expectations.49 Documents may evidence these social facts, but the 
same goes for an entry on the companies register. A contract is just as much a 
fiction as any abstraction, and so one might as well have called a corporation a 
‘nexus of fictions’. This does not advance the analysis. On the contrary, assertions 
like Easterbrook and Fischel’s that all stakeholders were ‘contracting 
nonetheless’,50 or the idea that there is a common theory applicable to all contract 
types,51 obscures economically and socially significant differences among different 
contracting parties. Why should commercial banks be viewed no differently to 
employees? Why should an asset management conglomerate be considered the 
same as a pensioner saving for retirement? How, except in the most superficial 
sense, is a multinational supplier the same as a consumer?52 In the end the 
normative claims of the nexus of contracts conception, like the value of 
oligarchical leadership or the superior moral significance of shareholder risk, are 
undermined by its own reliance on fictions. 
 
(3) CORPORATIONS AS INSTITUTIONS 
 
The third conception of a corporation as an institution abandons abstraction in 
appeal to social and economic reality.53 Corporations are ‘instituted’ by people in 
the sense that they must be positively created by different people’s contributions.54 
They are not simply conjured into existence by the hand of the state, nor does one 
group dominate in corporate governance because of a process of endogenous 
economic logic. Because people’s burdens and risks in a corporation differ, so 
should their benefits and their claims. Pure assertion does not make unequal 
parties equal. Social position, economic wealth and bargaining power of different 
                                                     
47 J Armour and C Mitchell, ‘Companies and other associations’ in A Burrows (ed), English Private Law 
(2013) ch 2. 
48 See O Kahn-Freund, ‘Hugo Sinzheimer 1875-1945’ in Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic 
(1981) 102 and F Neumann, Behemoth (1941) 366. 
49 cf A Smith, Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms (1763) Part I, Introduction and §9. It is interesting 
how economic and legal conceptions usually converge.  
50 FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416, 
1429-1430. 
51 OE Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985) 241, ‘A central thesis of this book is that a 
common theory of contract applies to transactions of all types – labor market transactions included. The 
organization of labor organization is nevertheless a very complicated matter.’ 
52 S Bainbridge, ‘Participatory Management within a Theory of the Firm’ (1996) 21 Journal of Corporate 
Law 657, 661, has said it is a metaphor and a useful heuristic rather than a positive account. But if this 
view is representative, then it just seems to be a misleading metaphor, and a bamboozling heuristic.  
53 See F Neumann, Behemoth (1941) 366-8 and F Kessler, ‘Book Review: Wirtschaftsfu  hrertum und 
Vertragsethik im Neuen Aktienrecht’ (1935) 83 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 393, 394.  
54 See generally, G Renard, L’institution: fondement d’une renovation de l’ordre social (1931).  
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parties, all mediated through a web of rules, are relevant to understanding 
corporations as institutions.  
Unlike the nexus of contracts, the institutional conception has no difficulty in 
identifying who is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ a corporation.55 The location of economic 
risk, which comes with the investment of capital or labour,56 is partly a product of 
different stakeholders’ bargaining power, and this (as well as transaction costs57) 
determines a firm’s boundaries. Shareholders do not have a privileged claim to 
governance rights over employees, because the risk of losing a job, or one’s 
livelihood, is difficult to diversify.58 Most people who have jobs would think this 
‘job risk’ has equal or weightier significance than a risk of falling share prices, 
because more people rely on their jobs than rely on shares. Moreover, today most 
shareholders are themselves institutions – not direct retail shareholders – who 
have appropriated shareholder rights with other people’s money. These asset 
managers and banks bear no risk, nor make asset specific investments, as nexus of 
contracts theorists mistakenly profess.59  
The legal tests to identify ‘employees’ have long understood enterprise (and 
thus the boundaries of the firm) through the institutional conception.60 
Institutional literature is concerned with transaction costs,61 but also with ‘non-
transaction costs’: the costs which different actors have by not coming to an 
agreement. This depends on relative wealth, because if people risk going hungry 
by not getting a job, or a less dignified retirement if their savings are not invested, 
they have higher ‘non-transaction costs’ than those with ample resources. Less 
                                                     
55 cf O Hart and J Moore, ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’ (1990) 98(6) Journal of Political 
Economy 1119, who suggest the firm is defined by the ability to fire workers selectively. This argument is a 
logical cliffhanger, because the right to disassociate from a service provider depends on both sides’ 
willingness, but this in turn depends on their bargaining power. Thus, the contractual rights of the parties 
merely reflect the economic reality (including wealth) of each. See further, R Hale, ‘Bargaining, Duress 
and Economic Liberty’ (1943) 43 Columbia Law Review 625. 
56 A phrase gladly borrowed from R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (2009) 44. 
57 cf RH Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4(16) Economica 386. Coase’s reduction of the firm to a 
question of transaction costs is therefore mistaken. It appears almost comically absurd when placed next 
to the work of the person who developed the transaction cost concept, and who knew all too well about 
the idea of bargaining power, JR Commons, ‘Institutional Economics’ (1931) 21 American Economic 
Review 648 and JR Commons and JB Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation (Harper 1916) ch 1, 9. 
58 E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 775. 
59 F Easterbrook and D Fischel, ‘Voting in Corporate Law’ (1983) 26 JLE 395, 403. OE Williamson, The 
Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985) 314. SM Bainbridge, ‘Participatory Management Within a Theory 
of the Firm’ (1996) 21(4) Journal of Corporation Law 729. 
60 e.g. Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV (2005) C-397/01, [2005] 1 CMLR 1123 and 
historically in Germany see Reichsarbeitsgerichtsentscheidung (15 Febraury 1930) Bensheimer 
Sammlung, vol 8, No 92, p 451, explored in O Kahn-Freund, ‘The Social Ideal of the Reich Labour 
Court - A Critical Examination of the Practice of the Reich Labour Court’ (1931) in O Kahn-Freund, R 
Lewis and J Clark (eds), Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic (Social Science Research Council 
1981) ch 3, 108, 143. For common law, see S Deakin and F Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: 
Industrialization, Employment, and Legal Evolution (2005) ch 2, ‘The Origins of the Contract of Employment’. 
The delineation of the firm is captured by Turberville v Stampe (1697) 91 ER 1072, Lord Holt CJ who, 
while discussing vicarious liability, says ‘it shall be intended, that the servant had authority from his 
master, it being for the master’s benefit.’  
61 On which, see JR Commons, ‘Institutional Economics’ (1931) 21 American Economic Review 648. 
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wealth decreases the ability to ‘hold out’ in negotiations.62 Wealth inequality 
therefore exacerbates inequality of bargaining power, which in turn produces 
significant imbalances in transactional terms. This affects productive efficiency, 
because when people are getting an unfair deal they lose the motivation to work.63 
The same is true when people can unjustly enrich themselves through their office, 
rather than by working.64 It follows that wealth inequality, and the inequality of 
bargaining power it produces, cannot be dismissed as an economic irrelevance.65 
On the contrary, the institutional conception of the corporation actively 
acknowledges difference in people’s economic and social status as it seeks to 
coordinate all stakeholders. 
The main difficulty with the institutional conception (perhaps like all 
conceptions that boil down to a word or phrase) is it can be made to stand for 
opposing things. In particular, in The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Oliver 
Williamson felt able to adopt the language of institutionalism, while simultaneously 
pledging fealty to the nexus of contracts conception, rejecting the existence or 
relevance of bargaining power, and opposing worker participation.66 This was said 
to be ‘new’ institutional economics, but the ‘new’ appeared so at odds with 
previous understandings that it was hard to see what was left of ‘institutional’ 
economics at all. ‘New’ institutionalism stripped away the social identity of the 
people that were fundamental to institutions in the first place.67  
Simon Deakin has since elaborated a countervailing conception of the 
‘corporation as commons’,68 following in the institutional tradition, and drawing 
on Elinor Ostrom’s work on common pool resources.69 To Deakin, the 
corporation ought to be seen as a common pool resource, where multiple 
                                                     
62 A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) Book I, ch 8, §12 and JR 
Commons and JB Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation (Harper 1916) ch 1, 9. 
63 A Marshall, Principles of Economics (3rd edn 1895) Book VI, ch 4, 649, and A Cohn, E Fehr, B Herrmann 
and F Schneider, ‘Social Comparison in the Workplace: Evidence from a Field Experiment’ (2014) 12(4) 
Journal of the European Economic Association 877.  
64 AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) 114.  
65 cf RA Posner, ‘Reflections on Consumerism’ (1973) 20 University of Chicago Law School Record 19, 
24-25, ‘The argument of “exploitation” based on “unequal bargaining power”, however, lacks, so far as I 
can see, any economic basis.’ 
66 OE Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985) 237-258, especially.  
67 Another example is DC North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990) 5, saying 
‘The strength of micro-economic theory is that it is constructed on the basis of assumptions about 
individual human behavior [...]’ and at 16, ‘In a zero-transaction-cost world, bargaining strength does not 
affect the efficiency of outcomes’. This is fanciful because bargaining power affects the fairness of terms, 
and fairness affects the motivation to work, including in a zero-transaction-cost world. See E 
McGaughey, ‘Behavioural Cconomics and Labour Law’ (2014) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 20/2014.  
68 S Deakin, ‘The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability 
in the Business Enterprise’ (2011) 37 Queen’s Law Journal 339. 
69 e.g. E Schlager and E Ostrom, ‘Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual 
Analysis’ (1992) 68(3) Land Economics 249. Ostrom received the Bank of Sweden Prize in Memorial of 
Alfred Nobel for 2009 jointly with Williamson. Their selection, even given their theoretical tensions in 
their work, seems to have been deliberate, and part of a developing tradition on the part of the Bank of 
Sweden’s selection panel, of highlighting unreconciled ideological divides within the economics 
profession.  
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constituencies stake claims to share in the product, and therefore its governance.70 
Of course, this does not suggest that all stakeholders have equal claims, as plainly 
some contribute more than others. Consumers of the occasional bag of pretzels 
do not contribute much but sporadic exchange, whereas consumers of a water 
company holding a natural monopoly do, because they are locked into an ongoing 
relationship by their unusual risk of finding no alternative supply. Just as the unity 
of the theory of contract could not be maintained,71 it is increasingly clear that 
there can be no unified theory of enterprise. The recognition that people have 
different needs in different circumstances means the corporation is not always just 
an economic, but also a ‘social institution’.72 Whenever a stakeholding group 
stands in a weak bargaining position, the institutional conception recognises a 
claim to participation in governance. This may not hold true for consumers all the 
time, nor for all shareholders all of the time. But for employees the claim to 
participate in governance always holds. 
Codetermination could only be genuinely compatible with the institutional 
conception of the firm. In the case of the Unternehmen an sich, codetermination may 
be tolerated, but the same conception is tolerant of an unrestricted right to 
manage: authoritarianism in stakeholder clothes. The nexus of contracts 
conception is actively hostile to worker participation, because with the fiction of 
contractual equality it attempts to eliminate the conceptual tools that distinguish 
different kinds of contractual relation. What do any of these approaches say about 
the actual evolution of corporate governance? The Unternehmen an sich suggests 
very little, but if anything, worker participation should only occur if the board 
views it as useful. The nexus of contracts idealists cannot see how codetermination 
would arise, except by legal ‘intervention’ in its imagined contractual construct. 
The institutional conception is dynamic, and does see a path for the evolution of 
corporate governance. It conceives of a way that the social power and economic 
circumstances of different actors will rise and fall, ebb and flow, in the channels of 
history. It is to this account that we now turn.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
70 Deakin (2011) 37 Queen’s Law Journal 339, 377-379. 
71 F Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43(5) 
Columbia Law Review 629, 636. 
72 Notably  L Strine, ‘Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests 
of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance’ (2007) 33 Journal of 
Corporate Law 1, 4. This is criticised by SM Bainbridge, ‘The Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in 
Corporate Governance: A Comment on Strine’ (2007) UCLA School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 07-15, who asks ‘What does Strine mean when he calls the 
corporation a social institution?’ It is not entirely clear if Bainbridge found an answer.  
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3. THE CODETERMINATION BARGAINS 
 
German codetermination was always part of a general movement for economic 
improvement. Culturally, it grew from the values of democracy, mutuality and 
solidarity that guilds and unions had promoted since the middle ages.73 
Intellectually, the idea was first articulated by a Catholic theologian, called Franz 
von Baader during the 1830s,74 and it had spread among those sympathetic to 
labour as a remedy for the depravation and dispossession of workers in the 
industrial revolution.75 Legally, it began with the Spring of Nations, the 
Revolutions of March 1848, as the social instability of the German industrial 
revolution had culminated.76 Mechanised production in urban factories had 
outcompeted old work traditions, forcing people to search the cities for 
employment. Often the work they found was scarce, and by 1847 food shortages 
greeted the work shortages when over 200 riots broke out across the German 
Länder. For example, in the streets surrounding the Law Faculty of Berlin 
University three days of rioting at potato stalls and bakeries had to be quelled by 
the military.77 In February 1848, Germans received news that the French had 
launched a revolt and the month after they followed. It was still 60 years before 
the first codetermination bargains, but it was the critical starting point for the law.  
 
(1) PAULSKIRCHE AND PROHIBITION 
 
As the revolution spread, people assembled to demand a common, elected 
Parliament in the Paulskirche of Frankfurt. The Fürsten, princes and despots were 
startled enough that they let the vote happen. Among the new members of 
Parliament was a Saxon textile factory owner named Carl Degenkolb. His business 
was printed cloth (Kattundruck) which used the sort of machinery that had acutely 
affected pre-mechanical craft work. His industry had been notable before the 
March Revolution (or Vormärz) for the sprouts of participatory social institutions 
at work, particularly saving schemes or Kassen78 for sickness, death and 
                                                     
73 HJ Teuteberg, Geschichte der Industriellen Mitbestimmung (1961) 118-119. Teuteberg’s work, a History of 
Industrial Codetermination, remains the premiere historical treatment of German codetermination up to the 
year 1916. 
74 Franz von Baader is identified by HJ Teuteberg, Geschichte der Industriellen Mitbestimmung in Deutschland 
(1961) 8 ff as the first to affirm a legal claim for worker participation. See F Baader, Über den Mißverhältnis 
der Vermögenslosen oder Proletairs zu den Vermögen besitzenden Classen der Societät (1835) or On the Inequality 
between the Dispossessed or the Proletariat and the Propertied Classes of Society. 
75 Immanuel Wohlwill, Robert von Mohl, Johannes Alois Perthaler and then the Centralverein für das 
Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen are further discussed by Teuteberg (1961) 19-58. 
76 EJ Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848-1875 (1975) ch 1 and EJ Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution 1789-
1848 (1962) ch 16. 
77 M Gailus, ‘Foot Riots in Germany in the Late 1840s’ (1994) 145 Past & Present 164-167 and 184-185. 
The ‘potato revolution’ began at a stall in Gendarmenmarkt, after the lady who owned the stall raised her 
prices. She ran to seek refuge, around the back of the Berlin University’s Law Faculty, to a bakery at 44 
Charlottenstrasse (now the site of the Berlin State Library) which was also subsequently attacked and 
demolished by the rioters. 
78 The author’s translation of ‘Kasse’ as ‘scheme’ is not completely accurate. A literal translation is ‘cache’, 
but this hardly sits well in English. A better word is simply ‘fund’, but in 2002 a vehicle called a 
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occasionally old age.79 Degenkolb had reached the view that workers, who 
otherwise had no substantial property to etch a living, needed to participate in the 
functioning of the economy as much as in political activity.80 Factories were not to 
be governed arbitrarily by an owner or employer, but by consent and by law.81 
Over the Frankfurt Parliament’s short span, Degenkolb allied himself to the 
majority liberal faction.82 On 24 May 1848 it convened an economic committee to 
propose a new business law. Degenkolb’s ideas did not win majority support, but 
he and a minority still composed a draft, released on 12 January 1849. It would 
have required councils in every German business district to be composed of 
representatives chosen by factory committees, one third elected by workers, and 
two thirds the employer.83 The purpose was to circumscribe the absolute will of 
the employer in all workplace affairs, by setting out a list of five issues which the 
work councils could reach decisions: mediating disputes between employers and 
employees, drafting and enforcing specific factory ordinances (including to ‘design 
regulations of the factory pension schemes and their administration’), 
administering the company health support schemes, monitoring child workers, 
and representing the factory in regional district councils.84 It was linked to a 
system of regional and national representation of workers in the country’s 
economic affairs.85 It was also clear that because their voice comprised a third of 
votes workers would be outvoted on any issue, and that because council 
representation was indirect it would always be employer controlled. Nevertheless, 
this was the first law ever drafted for general worker participation in the 
economy.86 
By the summer of 1849 the German aristocracy came to its senses. In March 
it had seen the new constitution that the Paulskirche in Frankfurt wanted, with its 
unwelcome guarantees of civil and political rights.87 It pulled Parliamentary 
representatives back to the Länder, imprisoned or executed troublesome 
opponents, and had military troops break up the rest. Before and after the 
Paulskirche failure, trade unions were unflinchingly suppressed. The Prussian 
                                                                                                                                       
Pensionsfond was created, and its legal distinction to a Pensionskasse means that we cannot use the word 
‘fund’ twice for different things. 
79 Teuteberg (1961) 164-175. 
80 HJ Teuteberg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten betrieblichen Arbeitervertretungen in 
Deutschland’ (1960) 11 Soziale Welt 69-82. 
81 C Degenkolb, Entwurf einer Fabrik-Gewerbe-Ordnung. Dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Ausschusse von seinem Mitgliede 
Degenkolb (1848) 10 ff. This is found in CD Haßler, Verhandlungen der deutschen verfassungsgebenden 
Reichsversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main (1848-1849) Band 2, 921 ff, as it is reproduced by Teuteberg (1961) 
109.  
82 Known as the Casino-Fraktion. The name derived from the name of their meeting hall, rather than any 
gambling tendencies. 
83 Entwurf 1848 §42. 
84 Entwurf einer Gewerbeordnung für das deutsche Reich 1849 §§43-5 (Draft Business Ordinance for the 
German Empire 1849).  
85 Teuteberg (1961) 109-111 and Teuteberg (1960) 11(1-2) Soziale Welt 69, 77-78. 
86 Teuteberg (1961) 111, ‘eines der bedeutendsten Dokumente in der Geschichte der deutschen 
Mitbestimmung’ or ‘one of the most significant documents in the history of German codetermination.’ 
87 Paulskirchenverfassung or Verfassung des deutschen Reiches (28 March 1849).  
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Gesetzessammlung 1845 (Consolidated Acts 1845) article 182 had stated ‘formation 
of associations by factory hands, journeymen, trainees or apprentices without 
police permission is punishable by fines of 50 Talers or up to four weeks 
imprisonment’, unless a stricter penalty was set out in law.88 The Paulskirche 
constitution had included freedom of association, and so implicitly the right for 
trade unions to form to seek collective agreements or take collective action.89 
Following the post-Paulskirche wave of repression, the Prussian Vereinsgesetz 1850 
(Association Act 1850) seemed to signal reconciliation and guarantee the same.90 
But soon enough, a Federal Decision in 1854 clarified the freedom was 
inapplicable to worker associations with ‘political, socialist or communist aims’.91 
This meant that, while the first general company laws were passed in the Allgemeine 
Deutsche Handelsgesetzbuch 1861 (General German Commercial Code 1861), workers 
remained wholly disabled from seeking a greater voice: that would be ‘political’. 
Strikes took place anyway, and after a wave of them in 1867, permanent union 
associations began to take shape.92 In 1869 a new North German Confederation 
Act apparently guaranteed freedom of association, except for farm, transport and 
government workers, but it excluded the right to take strike action.93  
If collective action by workers was suppressed, the only source for employee 
participation at work could be employers themselves, or the law. Degenkolb had 
returned quietly to his Saxon business, but he was determined to implement his 
proposals personally. With three like-minded industrialists in his area,94 Degenkolb 
agreed a business constitution, configured with only slight differences to the 
minority draft.95 The historian Hans Jürgen Teuteberg, in his exhaustive study of 
German codetermination before 1916, could apparently find no archival detail 
beyond the statute itself on how the plan played out practically, but believed it 
remained in force until Degenkolb passed away in 1862.96 These primeval roots of 
a participatory workplace, the most humble glimmer of an idea that was put into 
practice, was still very isolated where poverty was prevalent. Many other 
industrialists cared deeply for workers’ welfare, and were improving. Some even 
                                                     
88 PGBl (1845) art 182 A 443. nb art 134 guaranteed ‘freedom of contract’ initially granted when peasants 
were liberated from their ties of feudal serfdom, on 9 October 1807. This was the same year that the 
Slave Trade Act 1807 was passed by the UK Parliament, the first of a series of acts gradually abolishing 
the trading of slaves throughout the British Empire. 
89 Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches (28 March 1849) §59, ‘Der Reichsgewalt steht es zu, unbeschadet 
des durch die Grundrechte gewährleisteten Rechte der freien Vereinigung und Versammlung, 
Reichsgesetze über das Associationswesen zu erlassen.’ §§161-162 contained the rights on both gathering 
and associations. 
90 Verordnung vom Uten März 1850, A 443. 
91 Federal Decision (13 July 1854).  
92 M Schneider, A Brief History of the German Trade Unions (1989) ch 2. 
93 Gewerbeordnung 1869, Bundesgesetzblatt des Norddeutschen Bundes No 26 (21 June 1869) 281, 
§§152-153. 
94 Teuteberg (1960) 11 Soziale Welt 69, 78, the four groups of owners and businesses were Carl 
Degenkolb who owned Bodemer & Co.; Adolph Michael and CF Mitscherlich of Danneberg & Sohn; Gustav 
Ehrenberg and Carl Richter of Ehrenberg & Richter; and Jacob Bodemer Jr of Jacob Bodemer Jr. 
95 Teuteberg (1960) 11 Soziale Welt 69, 79 extracts the relevant provisions. 
96 Teuteberg (1960) 11 Soziale Welt 69, 82, footnote 15. Teuteberg (1961) 212-221. 
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sympathised with worker involvement.97 The small, slow start was far less of a 
problem for the idea in this, the world’s first general codetermination plan, than 
the overwhelming challenge of another view.  
The challenge was best represented by Alfred Krupp and his family. The 
Kruppian philosophy could well be summed up as a sincere display of obligation 
to the workforce, coupled with an absolute denial of workers’ right to self-
determination. ‘No other great industrialist’, wrote historian Wolf Schneider, 
‘esteemed the personal freedom of his workers so little and their material well-
being so highly.’98 Krupp had started a health care scheme by 1836, aptly 
evidenced by company account entries reading ‘26 Nov 1836, 2 Talers of 
punishment money donated to the sickness scheme’.99 A revised scheme for health 
and death benefits ran from 1853, which included worker voice of a sort. The 
statute provided that there would be six worker deputies elected to manage the 
scheme, but that Krupp himself had the same number of votes as a third of the 
workers, and that Krupp would be the scheme president.100 He could do anything 
that he liked.  
While the workforce could not organise and take collective action, the moral 
case for social welfare programmes was stronger. Krupp continued to introduce 
various schemes as his business grew dramatically after the 1850s, with a bakery in 
1858, housing from 1870, and subsidies for buying life insurance in 1877.101 But 
any sign of workforce dissent was punished. Already in 1848, the last of Krupp’s 
eight original workers had been dismissed for ‘signs of insubordination’. The 
company libraries prohibited literature of the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei 
(Social Democrat Workers Party) and even the Zentrumspartei (Centre Party). When 
strikes took place on the Ruhr in 1872, Krupp said it would be a personal affront 
if anyone joined, and immediately dismissed anyone tainted with social 
democracy.102 Everything he believed was summed up during a national election 
campaign on 15 March 1877, when Krupp wrote the following to his workers. 
 
 Despite repeated warnings, the spirit of social democracy seems to keep 
wanting to creep into a number of you. It is pernicious, and every reasonable 
person must attempt to fight it, the employee just as much as the employer 
[…]. That which has been earned by an industrious, thrifty family, that which 
a generation has honestly acquired, is what the indolent, the capricious are 
trying to snatch, to make the incompetent and the capable equal […]. I must 
                                                     
97 Teuteberg (1961) 199, provides a list of examples of participatory plans from the later 19th century. 
98 W Schneider, Essen - das Abenteuer einer Stadt (1963) 233, ‘Kein anderer Anführer des Industriezeitalters 
hat die persönliche Freiheit seiner Arbeiter so gering- und ihr leibliches Wohl so hochgeachtet.’ 
99 Teuteberg (1961) 192. 
100 Teuteberg (1961) 193. 
101 EC McCreary, ‘Social Welfare and Business: The Krupp Welfare Program, 1860-191’ (1968) 42(1) The 
Business History Review 24, 31-38. 
102 McCreary (1968) 42(1) The Business History Review 24, 47-48. 
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bear the losses of the business alone, and so the profits are also rightfully 
mine, because I have earned them with my strength and my diligence.103  
 
The challenge to the Paulskirche principles, then, that Krupp represented was the 
view that only the owner of the business had any right to participate an owner 
‘must bear the losses’. The loss that workers might suffer when dismissed seemed 
irrelevant. Krupp’s risk and ‘diligence’ led him to believe that he alone ‘earned’ 
every mark of profit, absolutely. While Degenkolb had been convinced that 
dispossessed workers needed participation or there would never be progress, 
Krupp saw his ownership of company property as requiring that all benefits of the 
worker’s labour accrued to the business. The leader had sole discretion of how the 
proceeds would be distributed. A separate company scheme for retirement and 
pensions was offered from 1885. It was linked to the number of years of service, 
and to income.104 But on the Krupp view there would hardly be any more scope 
for participation there. Any pension money built up, under this tradition of 
thought, was like any other contractual benefit: workers only had a right to insofar 
as the owner allowed it. 
There was little chance of improvement after Germany’s first unification. 
Before unification in 1871, there was a trend among some states to offer political 
channels for worker voice, outside their workplace. Typically a council elected by 
workers was created that could express a view to the Ministry for the Interior on 
proposed laws.105 These were purely consultative, and criticised by labour as a 
sham from the start.106  
In 1878 the first Sozialistengesetz (Socialist Act) was passed at the insistence of 
the Bismarck government.107 On its introduction, Bismarck said he wanted to 
‘improve the lot of the workers, including an association for the purpose of 
improving the position of the workers, to obtain for the workers a larger share in 
the profits of industry and to reduce working hours as far as is feasible’.108 But 
workers themselves could not participate in this process. Article 1 banned any 
‘associations with the purpose of overthrowing the existing state and social order 
by working for social democratic, socialist or communist ideas’. This made the 
                                                     
103 Extracted by W Schneider, Essen - Abenteuer einer Stadt (Econ Verlag 1963, new edn 1978), 232, ‘Trotz 
wiederholter Warnung scheint sich unter einem Theiler von Euch der Geist der Sozialdemokratie 
einschleichen zu wollen. Dieser Geist aber ist verderblich, und jeder Verständige muß ihn bekämpfen, der 
Arbeiter so gut wie der Arbeitgeber […]. Was eine fleißige sparsame Familie, was eine Generation ehrlich 
erworben hat, soll der Faule, Liederliche sich aneignen dürfen und der Unfähige dem Tüchtigen gleich 
gestellt werden… Wie ich den Verlust allein tragen muß, so ist auch der Gewinn mein von Rechtswegen, 
denn ich habe ihn erworben mit meiner Kraft und meiner Sorge.’ 
104 EC McCreary (1968) 33-34. Originally linked to disability benefits, it was linked to wages and years 
worked, financed with 1% worker and 0.5% employer contributions. Office workers allowed in 1890, and 
in 1895 it was available for any worker over 65 or with 40 years’ service. 
105 Teuteberg (1961) 326-341. 
106 AW Lette, ‘Die Organisation der arbeitenden Klassen und die Gewerbeordnung vom 9. Februar 1849’ 
in Mittheilungen des Centralvereins für das Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen (1849) 20-30. 
107 Sozialistengesetz (19 October 1878) RGBl 34, 351-358. Long title: ‘Law Against the Efforts of Social 
Democracy to Endanger Society.’ 
108 Otto von Bismarck (9 October 1878) quoted in Schneider (1989) 53. 
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essential work of trade unions impossible, because they did indeed believe in 
overthrowing the existing state and social order: a despotic monarchy, unspeakable 
poverty, oppression of conscience and association. It was true that social 
democrats could act through politics,109 and seek election to the Reichstag. But 
then the upper house of Parliament, the Bundesrat, could veto anything. Members 
there were elected, according to three class voting system in most states, according 
to the taxes that people paid: wealthier people having more votes. This meant that 
the option for social democrats of doing anything once in Parliament was largely 
foreclosed.  
The state had created another outlet of a kind. As part of Bismarck’s welfare 
reforms, the Krankenversicherungsgesetz 1883 (Health Insurance Act 1883) required 
the managers of the new company health schemes, in firms of over 50 staff, to be 
elected by a general meeting where the workforce held two thirds of the votes and 
the employer up to one third.110 The reason for the Bismarck government to 
introduce this form of worker voice appeared to be down to the existing health, 
pension and other social schemes where employers had introduced some voice. 
Though limited to a single issue, this was probably the world’s first statutory form 
of codetermination.111 Over 6000 schemes were created between 1883 and 1890, 
and continued to function well.112  
 
(2) FROM CONSULTATION TO CODETERMINATION 
 
The most severe suppression of social democracy ended in 1890, when the 
Sozialistengesetz was left to expire, and Otto von Bismarck was forced out of the 
Chancellorship. In 1888, a younger Kaiser Wilhelm II had acceded to the throne. 
He became interested in social affairs, and in 1889 when a strike on the Rhine and 
the Westfalian coal fields began, he expressed sympathy with the miners’ 
objectives. They wanted a rise in pay in line with the rising profits of the mine 
owners, but they also included another demand. A strike committee convened in 
Berlin on 15 May 1889, and apparently on the suggestion of the Berlin Liberal MP, 
Karl Baumbach, it was resolved that a compromise offer might be to introduce 
work councils with the right to participate on major economic changes to a 
business.  
As Wilhelm II said he saw it, the breaches of contract by the workers on 
strike were worthy of reproach, but ‘reasonable demands, if unheeded, turn into 
                                                     
109 Sozialistengesetz 1878, ‘Meetings relating to an election for the Reichstag or the state legislature’ 
exempted. 
110 Krankenversicherungsgesetz (15 June 1883) RGBl S. 73. §§34, 38 and 59-68. 
111 However, perhaps surprisingly the first statutory form of employee codetermination on company 
boards belonged to the UK, either in the South Metropolitan Gas Act 1896 or the Port of London Act 
1908. See E McGaughey, ‘British codetermination and the Churchillian Circle’ (2014) UCL LRI Working 
Paper 2/2014. 
112 Teuteberg (1961) 362-363. 
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unreasonable demands’.113 And put simply, ‘factory orders should no longer be 
issued unilaterally by enterprises, rather than be agreed with representatives of the 
workforce’.114 Bismarck seemed essentially opposed, but was weakening politically. 
He was defeated on 25 January 1890 in a vote in the Reichstag to renew the 
Sozialistengesetz. Wilhelm II drew up a work council plan along with Hans Hermann 
Freiherr von Berlepsch, Minister for Trade and Business from 31 January 1890. 
Their draft only envisaged an option for employers to set up work councils, and 
the intention was announced in a Decree by the Kaiser on 4 February. The 
moment proved ripe, because on 20 February, there was a general election. The 
Social Democrat Party emerged as the largest political party in Germany, although 
the voting system meant it had far fewer representatives than others in the 
Reichstag.115 This culmination of events meant that on March 18 Bismarck was 
forced to resign. The way was clear for reform. 
The Arbeiterschutzgesetz 1891 (Worker Protection Act 1891) was the result.116 
Amending the Gewerbeordnung 1883 (Business Ordinance 1883) it essentially 
introduced the provisions that Wilhelm II and Berlepsch had written.117 The 
essence was that under §134b, employers had a legal duty to issue workplace rules 
on four main issues: working times and breaks, the type and time of wage 
payment, notice periods and reasons for dismissals, and workplace punishments. 
Under §134d, employers had to let workers express a view, and an elected work 
council could be part of this. Naturally, this law did not appear much to 
representatives of workers. The Social Democrats opposed the law completely 
because according to August Bebel, it was a ‘sham system [...] a sham 
constitutional fig leaf, trying to conceal factory feudalism’.118 He made it known 
the SPD was opposed to worker councils in general, and was entirely uninterested 
in alternative plans for involvement in management, where workers could always 
be outspoken. 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, perhaps because he was still at an optimistic age of his 
early thirties, was surprised and impatient that the 1891 Act did not deliver quick 
results to the social landscape.119 There was also another specific Act, written in 
much the same way by Berlepsch, the Preussische Berggesetz 1892 (Prussian Mining 
Act 1892), but neither did this make much difference.120 Indeed, 1891 marked the 
                                                     
113 Teuteberg (1961) 373, ‘berechtigte Forderungen, wenn sie nicht berücksichtigt werden, sich in 
unberechtigte verwandeln’. 
114 Teuteberg (1961) 372, quoting Georg Freiherr von Eppstein (ed), Fürst Bismarcks Entlassung (1920) 149. 
DD218 E61. 
115 The SPD received 7.5% of the vote in 1873, 6.1% in 1881, 9.7% in 1884, 7.1% in 1887, 19.7% in 
1890. This produced only 35 seats, compared for example to the Zentrumspartei, with 18.6% of the vote 
and 106 seats. 
116 Gesetz betreffend Abänderung der Gewerbeordnung (1 June 1891) RGBl S. 261, §§134b and 134d. 
117 Teuteberg (1961) 373 and 377-378. The Act’s drafting is attributed to Theodor Lohmann and his 
assistants Dönhoff and von Meyeren. 
118 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages Session 1890/91, Band 
3, S. 2323. 
119 Teuteberg (1961) 400. 
120 Allgemeines Berggesetz für die Preussischen Staaten (24 June 1892) inserting §§80a to 80g into the 
former Berggesetz 1865. 
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point where more and more workers joined the trade union movement, the 
alternative that work councils were meant to stall, in the more free conditions for 
collective action. For different reasons, the workforce appeared just as 
disillusioned with the 1891 Act. In some regions, particularly around Tübingen in 
Württemberg, there were employers who embraced work councils. But because 
the system remained voluntary, by 1905 take-up had stalled at an estimated 10 per 
cent of German firms with over 20 employees.121 Not even the apparent approval 
from Pope Leo XIII, who had released an encyclical on the rights and duties of 
capital and labour in 1891, changed the fact that the employer’s natural interest 
was opposed.122 It seemed that, even if it might be better from a production 
viewpoint to have worker participation, employers would not seize the option if it 
was perceived as an effort, or it threatened any short term reduction of profits. 
And trade unions were not yet strong enough to force it. 
But although disillusioned with the superficial involvement that work councils 
produced, the experience made union and SPD members believe in reconstructing 
the councils with real participation power, and to make them obligatory. In 1900, 
Bavaria took the state-wide step of requiring consultative work councils in all its 
mining companies with over 20 staff.123 Not content, in March of 1901, the 
miners’ trade union called for compulsory councils across all mining companies.124 
When a strike broke out in 1905, greater participation became a key demand. The 
workers’ protest centred, among other things, upon the lack of health care, 
increases in working hours and pit closures. It first broke out at the mining 
company owned by Hugo Stinnes, described later as an ‘inveterate enemy of 
democracy’,125 and the strike spread until over 200,000 workers were involved. 
Employers refused to negotiate, but the Prussian state conceded that a political 
solution could be met. It launched an investigation and produced a new revision 
of the Preussische Berggesetz 1905 (Prussian Mining Act 1905).126 Under a new §80f, 
compulsory work councils would have the right to be heard on various workplace 
issues, where there were more than 100 employees. But the fact was, there were 
still no general participation rights yet. Workers could be heard, but ignored. 
The coming of war changed this. Politically, the leadership SPD and many of 
the trade unions supported the government as the Schlieffen Plan went into 
action. Kaiser Wilhelm II, addressing the Reichstag, seemed to believe that in war 
he had found the suspension of class conflict he had wanted. ‘Ich kenne keine 
Parteien mehr,’ he said, ‘ich kenne nur noch Deutsche.’127 But as war went onto 
                                                     
121 Teuteberg (1961) 402-408. 
122 Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (15 May 1891). The Vatican’s stance may have been influenced by 
Bismarck’s Kulturkampf. 
123 Berggesetz 1900 §§87-88 and 91. 
124 O Hue, Die Bergarbeiter (1913) Band 2, 540. HD 8039.M6 H88. 
125 The blunt assessment of FL Neumann, Behemoth (1941) 22. 
126 Gesetz, betreffend die Aba  nderung einzelner Bestimmungen des Allgemeinen Berggesetzes vom 24. 
Juni 1865/1892 (14 July 1905).  
127 ‘I no longer see parties, I only see Germans.’ 
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the end of its first, and then its second, and then its third year, as Germans and 
French bled in the mud of Verdun, and the bombs rained into the Somme, and 
drove men to madness, something of that confidence was lost. By December of 
1916, the Empire found it necessary to demand every man work. In one of its last 
Acts, in the Hilfsdienstgesetz 1916 (Auxillary Service Act 1916) forced labour was 
brought to the entire adult male population.128 The first draft had contained only 
four paragraphs, but revisions in Parliament expanded it to twenty. It was easy for 
social democrat politicians to introduce new demands, and they did, for 
compulsory work councils in workplaces with over 50 staff.129 But this time, it 
went further because instead of a right merely to be heard, §13 required that if 
agreement was not reached, the employer could be taken to arbitration. Teuteberg 
has marked this as ‘the end of the unilateral right to manage’.130 It was, apparently, 
‘the train of victory for the belief in the organisation’.131 But if the end of the 
unilateral right to manage came through a law, as Germany collapsed into 
revolution, as Wilhelm II was deposed, and the Empire crumbled, the beginning of 
modern German codetermination was different. 
 
(3) TWO COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
 
In early November 1918, the German army and people started a revolution that 
forced the war to a halt. On 9 November, the SPD leadership declared a Republic 
and Wilhelm II was compelled to abdicate. With an end to political imperialism, 
the question was what shape the economy would take. On 15 November 1918, the 
three largest unions met the employers’ federations to conclude an agreement for a 
post-war Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Workplace Community).132 With Hugo Stinnes 
representing employers,133 and Carl Legien for the trade unions, they signed the 
most important collective agreement in history. The Stinnes-Legien Abkommen 
(Stinnes-Legien Agreement) had as its centrepiece in §1 the ‘common resolution of 
all economic and social questions in German industry and trade’. Employers 
promised to end restrictions on freedom of association, to disestablish sham 
unions and to accept work councils in companies with over 50 staff.134 In those 
respects it resembled its contemporaries in the UK Whitley Reports and the US 
National War Labor Board resolutions. Yet the promise of codetermination 
arrived, not as a law, not as a regulation, but as an agreement. The reason that 
                                                     
128 Gesetz u  ber den vaterla  ndischen Hilfsdienst (5 December 1916)  RGBl S. 1333. §1. 
129 Antrag Spahn und Genossen (Drucksache Nr 532) and Antrag Albrecht und Genossen (Drucksache 
Nr 535). 
130 Teuteberg (1961) 508 ff. 
131 Gustav Stresemann, Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages, 
Legislaturperiode 1916/17, 2. Session, S. 2250. 
132 This was enacted in law as the Tarifvertragsverordnung (23 December 1918) RGBl 1918, Nr 287, S 
1456. 
133 nb: other signatories happened to include Walter Rathenau and Carl Friedrich von Siemens. 
134 See GD Feldman, ‘German Business between War and Revolution On the Origins of the Stinnes-
Legien Agreement’ in GA Ritter, Entstehung und Wandel der modernen Gesellschaft: Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg 
zum 65. Geburtstag (1970). 
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employers agreed was not because they were coerced or misinformed, or they 
suddenly realised that the social gains of worker participation in the economy 
would outweigh private costs. It was because at the end of the War their 
bargaining power, like the economy, lay in ruins.  
Collective agreement did not mean an easy transition to cooperative action. 
Carl Legien himself, like August Bebel before him, had remained highly sceptical 
of spreading codetermination because he believed it might spell the end for the 
purpose of trade unions.135 There was also dissent within the SPD leadership, but 
when the new Chancellor Phillip Scheidemann denied that a system of councils 
might be written into the constitution, mass demonstrations and strikes were 
mounted by the existing council members. They won. In March 1919 at the SPD 
conference, a labour lawyer and elected member of the interim Weimar National 
Assembly named Hugo Sinzheimer proposed a text for a right of codetermination 
in general, and work councils in particular, and it was adopted. Sinzheimer piloted 
the draft through the constitutional committee,136 and from 11 August 1919 the 
Weimar Constitution took effect.137 Article 153 stated that ‘property carries 
responsibility’ and article 165 gave workers the promise of participation in the 
‘entire field of economic development’, including ‘legal representation in factory 
workers councils’.  
The first of the ‘Goldilocks conditions’ was met after the War: the relative 
bargaining power of capital and labour had become more equal. But this would 
only translate into action on a second condition, that the labour movement was 
united. Labour representatives were uncertain till the end, but popular demand 
impelled them to action. This year was also the height of popular organisation. On 
15 March 1920, the unions achieved a decisive victory in preserving the 
democratic process against the Kapp Putsch.138 Conservatives and imperialist 
generals, who blamed the weakness of domestic liberals for losing World War 
One, attempted a military coup. They pointed to the humiliating terms of the 
Versailles Treaty and drew support from soldiers undergoing compulsory 
demobilisation. When a military faction occupied Berlin, the Social Democrat 
government called on the unions to hold a general strike, and over 12 million 
workers (half as many workers again as were union members) participated. 
Support for the coup was dwarfed and it ended in four days. But soon after this, 
the Social Democrat leadership fell. Soon economic disaster struck as reparation 
                                                     
135 R Dukes, ‘The Origins of the German System of Worker Representation’ (2005) 19 Historical Studies 
in Industrial Relations 31, 42-45. This is by far the best contextual treatment in English on the period 
between 1914 and 1922. 
136 K Kubo, Hugo Sinzheimer - Vater des deutschen Arbeitsrechts: eine Biographie (1995) 80-82. 
137 The Weimar Constitution is generally seen to have been a political settlement that codified this along 
with three other agreements, understandings or coalitions, regarding demobilisation (Hindenberg-Ebert), 
settlement within the Social Democrats to include legal codetermination, dispansion of Prussia and 
equalisation of the states, and a Parliamentary coalition among Social Democrats, the Catholic Centre and 
the Democrats. See FL Neumann, Behemoth (1941) 19-21. 
138 See GD Feldman, ‘Big Business and the Kapp Putsch’ (1971) 4(2) Central European History 99. 
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payments could not be kept,139 and the Ruhr was occupied by French troops. The 
Centre led government decided to print money as a way out, and hyperinflation 
ensued. Whereas union membership numbers had soared over the revolution, in 
the economic chaos membership to drop by a half.  
 
 
 
In the meantime, the question remained, how would the promises of the Stinnes-
Legien Abkommen, and its codification in the constitution, be shaped into primary 
legislation? The first concrete manifestation was the Betriebsrätegesetz 1920 (Work 
Councils Act 1920).140 Its most important provisions were that, first, in businesses 
with over 20 employees elected work councils,141 had nine tasks under §66. At 
least five of these were formulated more as duties: to promote the business’ 
success, contribute to implementing new work methods, guarding against 
instability, promoting understanding between workers and employers, and 
representing the workforce’s complaints.142 Two had more regulatory elements: 
                                                     
139 This was foreseen by JM Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919). The terms of Versailles 
drew a host of other critiques, including Adolf A. Berle, who had been working on the Wilson delegation. 
On this see Keynes’ ch III, on the moral collapse of the President.  
140 Betriebsrätegesetz 1920 (RGBl S 147, 4 February 1920). See E Frankel, ‘The German Works Councils’ 
(1923) 31(5) Journal of Political Economy 708. nb: I use the singular ‘work council’, maybe with an air of 
futility, but because ‘works’ mistranslates the genitive tense of ‘Betriebs-’ as a plural. Put another way 
literally, Betriebsräte means ‘Councils of Work’, or in a more comfortable English expression, work 
council.  
141 Betriebsrätegesetz 1920 §1. 
142 Betriebsrätegesetz 1920 §66 Nrs 1-3, 6 and 7. 
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assisting in implementing arbitral awards and health and safety regulations.143 Two 
appeared as genuine codetermination rights: to agree common terms and 
conditions of service, and to join in the administration of pension schemes, 
housing and other social facilities.144  
Second, in §§84-87 work councils gained the crucial, albeit negative, right of 
participating in dismissal decisions. Employees who were dismissed could appeal 
to the work council on grounds that they suffered gender, political, military, 
religious or union based discrimination, if dismissed without any reasons, or if it 
would cause significant hardship. The council could choose to take up the 
complaint to arbitration, and if the complaint were found justified compensation 
(but not reinstatement, yet) could be ordered. Third, in §70, where the company 
had a supervisory council, there was a right for one or two work council 
representatives to be seated as fully equal members. This required a further 
implementing law, which after significant protest from newly assertive businesses 
that wished to renege,145 succeeded in the Aufsichtsratgesetz 1922 (Supervisory 
Concil Act 1922).146 In §1, the law applied across all corporate forms, and 
regardless of the company constitution’s description of the supervisory council. 
Then §4 required one employee representative, or two in supervisory councils with 
three directors or more. 
Codetermination had been successfully codified, but its implementation over 
the Weimar Republic depended on the courts, and the continued strength of the 
unions to utilise it. To the judiciary of the Reichsgericht (still, anachronistically, 
named the ‘Empire Court’) it did not seem that the new social state was a 
particularly laudable aim. In 1923, under the leadership of Walter Simons, it 
expressed its view that the Weimar Constitution’s article 165 was a provision that 
had a ‘purely programmatic meaning’, and so it did not create any actual legal 
rights.147 This was an extremely curious opinion,148 not least since Hugo 
Sinzheimer had written the provision, and believed it to have had legally binding 
effect.149 But the Reichsgericht continued to repeat its stance.150 In any event, 
business learned quickly to actively evade what they saw as the most threatening 
provisions, of employee representatives on the supervisory councils. There were 
three basic strategies.151 First, the functions allocated to supervisory councils 
(except appointments, on which workers would be outvoted anyway) were 
                                                     
143 Betriebsrätegesetz 1920 §66 Nrs 4 and 8, though health and safety was also an area for common 
agreement. 
144 Betriebsrätegesetz 1920 §66 Nrs 5 and 9. 
145 G Flatow and O Kahn-Freund, Betriebsrätegesetz (13th edn 1931) 356, §70. 
146 Gesetz über die Entsendung von Betriebsratsmitgliedern in den Aufsichtsrat (1 February 1922) RGBl. 
I, S. 209. 
147 RG (25 September 1923) RGZ 107, 245, ‘nur programmatische Bedeutung’. 
148 For members of the non-British audience who may be wondering, phrases like ‘extremely curious’ are 
intended to be typical examples of polite understatement.  
149 H Sinzheimer, Grundzüge des Arbeitsrechts (2nd edn 1927) 73 and 209. 
150 e.g. RG (11 February 1926) RGZ 113, 33. 
151 See CW Guillebaud, The Works Council (1928) 191-196. 
  
Ewan McGaughey                                                                             The Codetermination Bargains 
 
 25 
reduced. Second, the number of meetings was reduced to one or two a year. Third, 
the shareholder representatives delegated tasks, by a majority vote, to sub-
committees they themselves appointed. The result was that, if indeed the 
supervisory council had performed a useful monitoring role before, it was severely 
impaired. It also left the work councils’ hopes of gaining insight into business 
management grievously disappointed. 
In 1929, the Reichsgericht leadership changed to Erwin Bumke.152 From this 
point the social state itself was perceived as causing economic problems, and it 
required constraint. So, the Reichsarbeitsgericht (Empire Labour Court) set about 
reinterpreting the general scheme of the work council laws. In particular, when 
representatives faced a choice, said the Reichsarbeitsgericht, under §66 they were 
bound to promote the interests of ‘the business’ over the interests of employees. 
For example, in a May 1929 case, a representative who refused to work more than 
an eight hour day was lawfully dismissed, even though he was in dispute with the 
employer over working time. He had to put ‘the business’ first.153 In a June 1929 
case, a representative who convened a union meeting after a work council meeting 
could be lawfully summarily dismissed. He had not been putting ‘the business’ 
first.154  
This policy shift did not escape a young judge of the Berlin Labour Court. 
Otto Kahn-Freund had studied in Frankfurt with Sinzheimer. While co-authoring 
a leading commentary with Georg Flatow and based exhaustive analysis of the 
post-1929 case law, he contended in a separate article that the Reichsarbeitsgericht 
was doing no more than reinterpreting the duties of work councillors as being 
owed to the employer. ‘The business’ was indistinguishable in practice. At the 
same time the courts proclaimed, in their jurisprudence on social insurance, the 
goal of welfare for the isolated worker. Yet workers could not combine to take 
collective action. Conflict among syndicates of capital and labour were key to 
social relations, but whenever necessary, conflict would be suppressed in favour of 
unity and loyalty to a central authority. The social ideal pursued by the court was, 
concluded Kahn-Freund, fascist.155 Later in life, Kahn-Freund said that he had 
‘made a great mistake’, because he ‘overestimated the political self-consciousness 
of the judiciary’. Rather, there was an ‘objective factor [...] socially embedded’.156 
Fascism was an unconscious culture. 
Kahn-Freund was denounced and shunned by the legal academy and trade 
unions. Perhaps it was because they thought it necessary to keep the appellate 
courts content. Clemens Nörpel, co-director of the work council centre, at the 
                                                     
152 Erwin Bumke was a member of the far right nationalist Deutschnationale Volkspartei. He joined the 
Nazi Party in 1937, had an illustrious career, and committed suicide in 1945. 
153 RAG (29 May 1929) Bensheimer Sammlung vol 6, no 92, 335. 
154 RAG (10 July 1929) BS vol 6, no 77, 320. 
155 O Kahn Freund, ‘The Social Ideal of the Reich Labour Court - A Critical Examination of the Practice 
of the Reich Labour Court’ (1931) in O Kahn-Freund, R Lewis and J Clark (eds), Labour Law and Politics in 
the Weimar Republic (Social Science Research Council 1981) ch 3, 108-161. 
156 O Kahn-Freund, ‘Autobiographische Erinnerungen an die Weimarer Republik. Ein Gespräch mit 
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Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB, General German Trade Union 
Federation) demanded that the article be withdrawn.157 Some among the unions 
did appear to have a great deal to lose. Over the 1920s, officials had displayed 
similar tendencies to those of supervisory council members as they collected 
position after position. There were official posts in arbitration panels, on company 
boards, social insurance boards, or related to politics. A single person frequently 
had five or six ‘jobs’. According to Franz Neumann, a remarkable labour lawyer 
who was forced to flee from Germany in 1933, there ‘was even a trade-union 
bicycle factory [...] Bound so closely to the existing regime and having become so 
completely bureaucratic, the unions and the party lost their freedom of action’.158 
When the Wall Street Crash came in 1929, as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act 
1930 triggered a lock down of international trade, as foreign investment was 
withdrawn, as unemployment rose, and severe depression ensued, the unions were 
further weakened, especially those which paid unemployment support. Meanwhile, 
on 18 May 1932, another ‘collective agreement’ of sorts was being made. Hitler 
was explaining his intention to abolish the trade unions, as well as political parties, 
to the Nazi’s financial backers, the Freundeskreis der Wirtschaft (Circle of Economic 
Friends).159 Placing the blame on socialism, trade unions and democracy proved to 
be popular among business. With significant financial support, Hitler’s party had 
climbed dramatically, though it had then fallen, in the four national elections since 
the start of the financial crisis to the election on 6 November 1932.160 Other 
conservative parties had initially opposed Hitler. But then as the conservative 
                                                     
157 Kahn-Freund [1981] Kritische Justiz 183, 193. See also O Kahn-Freund, ‘Letter to Clemens Nörpel’ 
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160 Hitler had been released from prison in 1924, and the ban on his public speaking had been lifted in 
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Observation Handbook (6th edn 2010) 18. 
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DNVP leader, Franz von Papen, turned on the nationalist Chancellor General von 
Schleicher, he believed that he might strengthen his own party through a coalition 
with the Nazis. On 4 January 1933 in the Cologne residence of the banker, Baron 
Kurt von Schröder, Hitler met with Franz von Papen and agreed to join in 
government. Franz von Papen believed he could control Hitler because key 
ministries such as tax and the military were reserved. But Hitler would become 
Chancellor and get control of the Ministry of Interior. He got the police.161 The 
change took place formally on 30 January.  
And from then it was just a tragic matter of time. On 9 February, the three 
leading employees of the public radio service were dismissed, because they were 
accused of being communists. Hitler was preparing to hold another vote. A 
meeting was arranged with the largest business conglomerates on 20 February 
1933, led by Gustav Krupp. Hitler lectured that Weimar democracy needed to be 
destroyed in order for private ownership of the means of production to prevail, 
and for the capitalist system to be protected. Krupp and the gathering gave 
unanimous support, and pledged a million Marks for the campaign, set on 6 
March 1933.162 The election was characterised by Nazi gangsters beating up 
opposition campaigners, and imprisonment of the Communist Party leaders who 
were falsely accused of burning the Reichstag. After this sustained campaign of 
media intimidation, voter suppression and violence, the Nazis reported themselves 
winning 44 per cent of the vote. In the hope of not being shut down, the 
leadership of the trade union movement, the ADGB, feebly stated the Nazi 
victory was a victory for unions too.163 Neumann assessed the situation like this. 
 
 Real opposition would have meant strikes, perhaps a general strike and civil 
war. The movement was neither ideologically nor organizationally prepared 
for drastic struggle. They could not even fulfil their inner trade-union 
functions. What little funds remained after the depression were invested in 
beautiful office buildings, trade-union schools, real estate, building 
corporations, and printing plants. There was not enough left for their 
unemployed members.164 
                                                     
161 Schweitzer (1964) 104-105, ‘the Hitler-von Papen government was not only a coalition between the 
NSDAP and the DNVP; it was also the government of big business and the landowners, because it was 
their alliance with the Nazis that had persuaded von Hindenburg to appoint Hitler.’ 106-7, the 
conservative parties believed ‘the Nazis would be only junior partners [...] The Nazis were given control 
only over the police, whereas the presidency, the army, and the economic ministries were all in the hands 
of members of the upper class. Its leaders were convinced that their instruments of power, namely the 
army, the government purse, and control of the economy, were superior to the power held by the Nazi 
party and its para-military organizations.’ 
162 Schweitzer (1964) 105, citing Affadavit of Schacht in NI-406, the ‘I.G. Farben Case,’ Prosecution, Vol. 
II. ‘After Hitler made his speech, the old Krupp answered Hitler and expressed the unanimous feeling of 
the industrialist in support of Hitler.’  D-203 and 204, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI, 1080-85. 
Krupp welcomed Hitler’s programme and looked forward to a politically strong and independent state 
providing conditions for business prosperity. The one million Marks pledged was to be divided between 
the Nazis, the DNVP and the DVP. 
163 R Lewis and J Clark, ‘Introduction’ in Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic (1981) 28-30. 
164 Neumann (1941) 336. 
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The radio employees had brought their unfair dismissal claim to Kahn-
Freund’s court, and on 14 March his decision was released awarding the maximum 
level of damages.165 He was dismissed for ‘political unreliability’ on 23 March, and 
the day after, on the pretext of responding to the Reichstag fire, the 
Ermächtigungsgesetz 1933 (Enabling Act 1933) was passed, delivering Hitler the 
power to legislate without Parliament. 
It was coming up to May Day, the traditional day of protest and celebration 
for labour rights. With a craven cowardice, one without parallel, the unions 
requested participation in the official Nazi rally ‘for the honour of creative labour, 
for the complete incorporation of the working masses into the state’.166 Then they 
stood and cheered at the parades. The next day, on the 2 May 1933, the order was 
given and all the union offices of ADGB members were occupied by the SA and 
SS.167 All union leaders were arrested and imprisoned, and all union assets were 
seized.168 ‘It took exactly thirty minutes for the huge trade-union structure to 
collapse’, wrote Neumann. ‘They had become machines without enthusiasm or 
flexibility. They no longer believed in themselves.’169  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
165 Kahn-Freund [1981] Kritische Justiz 183, 199. 
166 Lewis and Clark (1981) 28-30, quote the translated request. Neumann (1941) 337, the unions showed 
‘more than just cowardice. It was a complete failure to appreciate the real character of National Socialism, 
and it opened the eyes of the National Socialists. They saw that even the little strength they had attributed 
to the trade unions was an illusion.’ 
167 The offices and assets of the Christian trade unions were occupied on 24 June 1933, Neumann (1941) 
338. 
168 In a roughly sequential order of destruction, the Nazis destroyed (1) the Communist Party (2) the 
socialist trade unions (3) the Social Democrat Party (4) the Christian trade unions (5) the liberal trade 
unions (6) all other political parties (7) all independent social clubs and associations (8) anyone with 
Jewish family (9) homosexuals (10) disabled children (11) business (12) the countries they invaded (13) 
their own population (14) themselves.  
169 Neumann (1941) 337. 
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May Day 1933, Unter den Linden, Berlin, near the Lustgarten. Berlin University’s Law Faculty is down 
the street to the left. Union members and officials cheer Hitler. Source: Bundesarchiv Bild 102-15783. 
 
Nobody was safe. Kahn-Freund’s house was ransacked by the Schutzstaffel (the 
‘Protection Squad’, better known as the SS) and in June he fled to England. 
Neumann was forced to flee as well. Hugo Sinzheimer escaped to Holland, but 
was arrested in 1941, and placed in a concentration camp. Friends and family 
miraculously managed to secure his release, and for the remainder of the war he 
had no choice but to hide below a roof. Sinzheimer lived to see the military defeat 
of Nazism, and walked free once more, before he passed away.170  
How did codetermination develop under the Nazi regime? The basic principle 
in the new labour law was that everyone would follow the leader of the business, 
and pledge allegiance to the abstract conception of the undertaking.171 On 3 May 
1933, a replacement for the trade unions was created, the Deutsche Arbeitsfront 
(German Labour Front). Every person who worked for a living, eventually 
including employed and self-employed people alike, was socially compelled to 
join.172 The DAF was a branch of the Nazi party, commanded directly by Hitler.173 
                                                     
170 K Kubo, Hugo Sinzheimer - Vater des deutschen Arbeitsrechts: eine Biographie (1995) 150 ff. 
171 See generally, K Lowenstein, ‘Law in the Third Reich’ (1936) 45(5) Yale Law Journal 779 and NA 
Pelcovtis, ‘The Social Honor Courts of Nazi Germany’ (1938) 53(3) Political Science Quarterly 350. 
Crucially, the same general duties owed to a business were placed in the Public Companies Act 1937, the 
Aktiengesetz 1937. 
172 Neumann (1941) 341, ‘Although there is no legal compulsion to join the Labour Front, the pressure is 
so strong that it is inadvisable for anyone to stay out. The members must attend meetings, but must not 
enter into discussion.’ 
173 Erste Verordnung des Führers und Reichskanzlers über Wesen und Ziel der Deutschen Arbeitsfront 
vom 24. Oktober 1934. 
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Its titular leader was Dr Robert Ley, a persistent alcoholic who committed suicide 
before his Nuremberg trial. A primary task was to create ‘understanding’ among 
the ‘business leaders’ for their ‘followers’. In return the followers were to 
understand the situation and possibilities of the business, by finding the common 
basis of their ‘justified interests’ so long as those were in line with Nazi 
principles.174 DAF periodicals were filled with propaganda. Meetings were 
compulsory, but discussion was absent.175 In each workplace, DAF officials acted, 
in the words of Ley, as ‘the soldier-like kernel of the plant community which 
obeys the Leader blindly. Its motto is “the Leader is always right”.’176 The same 
Führerprinzip had prevailed in labour law as it would in company law, with the 
drafting of the Aktiengesetz 1937 (Public Companies Act 1937). Nazi ideology was 
not content until it thrust its pathological paranoia onto every association, even 
clubs for playing chess and collecting stamps.177 
Formally, codetermination was abolished in 1934.178 Works councils were 
continued for a short run in a way: the Vertrauensräte, or Councils of Confidence, 
replaced them and elections were again conducted in 1935. However, Nazi Party 
nominees were frequently failing to be supported by a majority of workers, and so 
even these exercises in manufactured approval were scrapped. The positions 
replaced with appointed ‘Trustees of Labour’.179 ‘The important point’, wrote 
Neumann, ‘is that the individual workers are not members of the federal plant 
communities. They are solely and exclusively members of the total body, the 
Labour Front itself.’ There could be no belonging by an individual to a group, 
except the dominant group. There could be no affiliation, except to the 
nationalised Nazi union. All this was the fruit of that second ‘collective 
agreement’. 
It took very little time before business found that they were not benefiting 
from the abolition of the unions as much as they had expected. Fritz Thyssen, the 
inheritor of a steel conglomerate and initial Nazi financier, bemoaned the way big 
                                                     
174 DAF Verordnung 1934 §7, ‘Interessenvertretung der Beschäftigen. Die Deutsche Arbeitsfront hat den 
Arbeitsfrieden dadurch zu sichern, daß bei den Betriebsführern das Verständnis für die berechtigten 
Ansprüche ihrer Gefolgschaft, bei den Gefolgschaften das Verständnis für die Lage und die 
Möglichkeiten ihres Betriebes geschaffen wird. Die Deutsche Arbeitsfront hat die Aufgabe, zwischen den 
berechtigten Interessen aller Beteiligten jenen Ausgleich zu finden, der den nationalsozialistischen 
Grundsätzen entspricht und die Anzahl der Fälle einschränkt, die den nach dem Gesetz vom 20. Januar 
1934 zur Entscheidung allein zuständigen staatlichen Organen zu überweisen sind.’  
175 Neumann (1941) 340-341, elaborates five functions as indoctrination, taxation, securing positions for 
reliable party members, atomising the working classes, and ‘the exercise of certain inner trade-union 
functions.’ 
176 Neumann (1941) 340. 
177 K Robert (a pseudonym), Hitler’s Counterfeit Reich (1941) 27-28. 
178 Arbeitsordnungsgesetz 1934 (RGBl I, 45). 
179 Schweitzer (1964) 368, ‘the election of representatives to the councils of confidence in 1935 revealed a 
significant opposition of workers to the leader-follower arrangement of the Nazi regime. As Bormann 
reported to Hitler in April of 1935, “not even 50 per cent of the labor force in many plants gave an 
affirmative vote” for those nominated by the party for membership in the councils.’ Schweitzer in turn 
refers to T Eschenburg, ‘Streiflichter zur Geschichte der Wahlen im Dritten Reich’ (1955) 3 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 311, 315. 
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business was led on with promises of all kinds, especially to break the strikes and 
the unions. But then they only found their organisations infiltrated with agents of 
the Nazi party in the DAF.180 In 1941, Gustav Krupp had suffered a stroke,181 and 
the family legacy had passed to Alfried Krupp. At his Nuremburg trial the last 
Krupp tried to explain how they had seen matters.  
 
 The economy required sound or elevated development. The fighting between 
multiple German political parties and the disorder meant there was no 
opportunity for building prosperity [...]. We formed the impression that Hitler 
would bring us healthly development. And in fact he did [...]. We Kruppians 
have never cared much for ideas. We simply wanted a system that functioned 
well and gave us the opportunity to work without interference. Politics is not 
our thing.182 
 
If ‘a system that functioned well’ was the goal, the outcome was infinitely worse. 
The Nazi state was financially bankrupt by the time it began its campaign to 
conquer and enslave continental Europe.183 If there had been full employment, it 
was far from full employment in a free society.184 Economically, wrote Neumann, 
the German worker had ‘obtained security before the outbreak of the war’, but at 
a horrible cost. It was underwritten by,  
 
 the utmost physical insecurity, namely for death [...]. Death in the trenches, 
death in air raids, death in the factories as a result of physical exhaustion, 
death in the railroad yards, chemical factories, and the like as a result of a 
terrific increase in industrial accidents. The connection between economic 
security and death is not incidental, it is essential... an aggressive imperialist 
system seeking to transform markets into colonies.185 
 
All the while, wrote Kahn-Freund from London, opponents of the Nazis had 
sounded a ‘pathetic craving for “legality” and “constitutionalism”, which paralysed 
                                                     
180 Robert (1941) 35-36. After cooperation with the Nazis Thyssen opposed the war at its outbreak, was 
captured and imprisoned until the end of the war.  
181 Gustav Krupp was indicted for war crimes at the Nuremberg trials, but did not stand because he had 
gone senile. He died of syphilis in 1950. 
182 Quoted in DM Friz and G Mann, Die Stahlgiganten: Alfried Krupp und Berthold Beitz (1990) 33, ‘Die 
Wirtschaft brauchte eine ruhige oder aufwärts steigende Entwicklung. Infolge des Kampfes zwischen den 
vielen deutschen Parteien und der Unordnung gab es keine Möglichkeit für aufbauende Tätigkeit. [...] Wir 
hatten den Eindruck, daß Hitler uns solch eine gesunde Entwicklung bescheren würde. Tatsächlich hat er 
das getan. [...] Wir Kruppianer haben uns nie viel um Ideen gekümmert. Wir wollten nur ein System, das 
gut funktionierte und das uns eine Gelegenheit gab, ungestört zu arbeiten. Politik ist nicht unsere Sache.’ 
183 Robert (1941) 41, chs 9 and 10, and 121, ‘force and slave economy are not merely separated by an 
unbridgeable gulf of a free economic system; but the despotic system, in order merely to maintain itself, 
must fight the free economic system – vastly superior to it technically, commercially and intellectually – 
but relentless, unscrupulous, cunning force.’ 
184 This was one of the more significant contrasts made in the title of W Beveridge, Full Employment in a 
Free Society (1944). 
185 FL Neumann, ‘Labor Mobilization in the National Socialist New Order’ (1942) 9(3) Law and 
Contemporary Problems 544, 546.  
                         10/2015 
 
 32 
the German left and finally led to its downfall’.186 This explains part of the 
profound commitment to union independence, and aversion to legal resolution of 
labour disputes, which Kahn-Freund would come to call collective laissez-faire. The 
tiefsitzend, deep-seated, anxiety that Kahn-Freund had acquired, and brought to UK 
labour law,187 was that if labour participation depended on the courts and the state 
in any way, it could be taken over. 
 
(4) THE RECONSTRUCTION 
 
After the Second World War, Germany’s unions found themselves in a greater 
position of power relative to the morally bankrupt corporations that supported 
Nazism.188 The reconstruction of the union movement was not as quick as hoped, 
because it was the Allied policy, for example in the US zone according to General 
Clay, that unions should be organised from ‘the bottom up’ and ‘should be first 
local in character and extended no faster than the proven capacity for democratic 
responsibility and action’.189 Still, for example near Esslingen in Württemberg, 
people spontaneously organised Arbeiterausschüsse (worker committees) which 
actively identified Nazis, supported welfare and housing, and assisted rebuilding 
unions. Overall, the US administration saw this as positive. 
 
 That unions may serve as a medium for the inculcation of democratic ideals 
and practices in German life is indicated from the results of opinion polls in 
Darmstadt. A sampling of union and non-union workers in that city shows 
union members to be less sympathetic toward Nazi ideas, less inclined to 
oppose denazification measures, than the population as a whole. Strongest 
pro-Nazi sentiments were revealed to linger among former white-collar 
workers.190 
 
However, only in April 1946 did the US zone administration allow unions to 
organise regionally and nationally.191 At the same time, the Control Council Law 
No 22 of 1946 authorised work councils to be formed. This was not compulsory, 
but rather articles I to III stated that work councils were permitted, without any 
former DAF or Nazi members, where representatives were elected by democratic 
                                                     
186 O Kahn-Freund, ‘The Weimar Constitution’ (1944) 15 Political Quarterly 235. 
187 See E McGaughey, ‘British codetermination and the Churchillian Circle’ (2014) UCL LRI Working 
Paper 2/2014. 
188 See generally, A Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich (1964). This is not, of course, to suggest that 
every business was supportive of the government, and on the contrary, remarkable examples of resistance 
exist, most famously captured in T Keneally, Schindler’s Ark (1982). 
189 Military Government of Germany, Manpower Division (20 October 1945) No 3, 4. 
190 MG of Germany (November 1945) No. 4, 8.  
191 MG of Germany (April 20 1946) No. 9, 5, ‘Trade unions in the U.S. Zone are entering the second 
phase of their development. In all major industrial centers local unions mainly of the industrial type have 
established themselves on democratic foundations and are now reaching out into the wider fields of the 
Laender.’ 
  
Ewan McGaughey                                                                             The Codetermination Bargains 
 
 33 
methods.192 Once formed, article V listed the various legitimate functions of work 
councils.193 Article VI(3) envisaged the possibility for work council members to 
attend company supervisory boards, for the purpose of information. It was on this 
basis that work councils quickly spread again. One of the earliest instances 
happened to be AEG in Berlin, Rathenau’s old firm.194 There was no legal 
coercion to reintroduce codetermination because the Control Council Law No 22 
was facilitative, not compulsory. Agreement would need be reached between 
workers and employers.  
Unions were permitted organise without prior Allied authority from October 
1946 in the British zone and April 1947 in the American.195 Their focus lay 
squarely upon work councils and board codetermination. German unions had, 
unlike their UK counterparts, lost as much interest in nationalisation of industry 
because they themselves were nationalised by the fascist government. The union 
movement now sought direct participation in the economy, ‘socialising power 
without socialising ownership’, with ‘distribution of power to the people rather 
than a concentration of ownership in the state’.196 In the coal and steel fields, there 
was a call for nationalisation at the unions’ conference in Bielefeld in 1946. But 
crucially there was also a call, articulated by union economist Dr Erich Potthoff, 
for equal representation in management.197  
The employer side of the industry had been placed under Allied trusteeship. 
A British civil servant named William Harris-Burland oversaw it, but had put at 
the head a leading steel manager (never a Nazi member) called Heinrich 
Dinkelbach.198 To implement the policy to demonopolise the industry,199 they 
sought the unions’ cooperation. In October 1946, Dinkelbach made a proposal to 
Hans Böckler, lead representative of the union delegation, that seats on the 
supervisory board be shared equally. Over a series of conferences, in January 1947, 
the details were agreed, and the plan put into effect, with five supervisory board 
representatives each chosen by shareholders and unions, and a chair by the 
government.200 Outside this agreement, there was another three week stoppage by 
                                                     
192 Control Council Law No 22 Works Councils (10 April 1946) in Official Gazette of the Control Council for 
Germany (1945-1946), arts I-III. 43(R498). 
193 Control Council Law No 22 (1946) art V, function to protect worker interests in application of 
collective agreements, health, safety, hiring, dismissals, complaints, improvement of work methods, 
welfare. 
194 Agreement of the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft Berlin (25 October 1946) referred to by P 
Fisher, ‘Labor Codetermination in Germany’ (1951) 18(1) Social Research 449, 455. 
195 Control Commission for Germany (British Element), Report for the Month of October 1946, 23. Military 
Government of Germany, Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone (April 1947) No 22, 19. 
196 C Kerr, ‘The trade union movement and the redistribution of power in postwar Germany’ (1954) 
68(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics 535, 535, 544-545 and 555, quoting Viktor Agartz of the DGB. 
Trade unionists did, however, still nationalisation of ‘key industries’, see Protokoll Gründungskongress des 
Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes (Köln Bund-Verlag 1950) 318-32. 
197 See his account of the following events in E Potthoff, Der Kampf um die Montan-Mitbestimmung (1957) 
198 Dinkelbach was a Catholic, and after his role in the foundation of the steel plan, he was made a Papal 
count, which it is possible indicated the Vatican’s support for codetermination. 
199 See Gesetz der Alliierten Hohen Kommission Nr. 27. 
200 EF Beal, ‘Origins of Codetermination’ (1955) 8(4) Industrial and Labor Relations Review 483, 493-
495. 
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workers also in Bielefeld, who demanded codetermination in management: and it 
was conceded.201  
Thus, after World War Two, both in work councils and in the first instance 
on the boards of coal and steel firms, codetermination was recreated through 
collective agreement, precisely as the DGB had aimed to do.202 The charge has 
been made that the British were mainly responsible for it. This view, which comes 
packaged either as a variant of Dolchstoßlegende by those who oppose 
codetermination,203 or from British people who want to claim credit for 
everything,204 simply does not fit the evidence. First, board representation was 
driven primarily by the unions’ bargaining objectives, to both restore and extend 
the position in Weimar. Second, it was a German management with whom they 
bargained.  
Third, and most important, the Allied occupation was heavily divided in its 
views on codetermination. In the British zone, one of the Hamburg legislature’s 
first acts was to introduce codetermination in 1946. The Military Government 
refused the measure on the ground it would be incompatible with Control Council 
Law No 22, article VI(3) to have a law.205 By 1948 Rheinland-Pfalz and Baden in 
the French zone, and Württemburg Baden and Hessen in the US zone, had passed 
similar bills, often fitting into their constitutional provisions that were modelled on 
Weimar’s article 165.206 These efforts were promptly scuttled by the Allied 
occupiers on the pretext that the British had originally given: Control Council Law 
No 22 was the policy for now.207 But also it was said that future changes should be 
determined democratically by the whole country, when ‘the future political 
structure of Germany has been established and conditions are more stable than at 
present’.208 On 3 September 1948, General Clay unilaterally suspended parts of the 
new laws in Hessen and Württemburg-Baden,209 and they did not come into effect 
                                                     
201 Control Commission for German (British Element), Report for the Month of May 1947, 41. 
202 Betriebs-Berater (1946) X 53 (page 14 of issue 10).  
203 The ‘stab in the back legend’ was the view that the First World War was lost because social democrats 
on the home front betrayed the soldiers in the trenches. There is, apparently, always someone else to 
blame.   
204 e.g. A Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin Volume 1: Trade Union Leader 1881-1940 (1960) 435-6, 
who was attempting to garner support for the plan in the UK.  
205 Betriebs-Berater (1946) XIII, 46 (page 14 of the 13th issue). 
206 Rheinland-Pfälzischen Landesverordnung über die Errichtung und die Tätigkeit von Betriebsräten 
vom 15.5.1947 (VOBl. S 258, §43. Württemburg-Baden Gesetz Nr 726 über die Beteiligung der 
Arbeitnehmer an der Verwaltung und Gestaltung der Betriebe der Privatwirtschaft vom 18.8.1948, RegBl. 
1948 S.136, §24. Verfassung art 22. Betriebsrätegesetz für das Land Hessen vom 31.5.1948, GVBl. 1948 
S. 117, §55. Verfassung art 37. Baden Landesgesetz über die Bildung von Betriebsräten vom 24.9.1948, 
GVBl. 1948 S.209, §25.   
207 Beal (1955) 8(4) Industrial and Labor Relations Review 483, 493. 
208 Military Government of Germany, Manpower, Trade Unions and Working Conditions: Monthly Report of 
Military Governor U.S. Zone (March 1947 - February 1948) No. 32, 17-18. See also, Control Commission 
for Germany (British Element), Report for the Quarter 1st January - 31st March, 1951, 41. 
209 Betriebs-Berater (1949) 335. This lasted until the successor, John J McCloy, lifted the suspension on 7 
April 1950.  
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elsewhere.210 Yet it was in the British zone that the quickest suppression of 
codetermination took place.211 If the British had not been there, development 
would have been quicker, and it would have come by law. But that is not how it 
happened. It happened slowly, and it happened through collective bargaining. 
Why was there discord among the Allies? Many British staff were from the 
Ministry of Labour, imbued with Whitley traditions of voluntarism. Many had 
other views. But it seems plain that in such a large operation, people had different 
opinions. This left, as the US Military Government stated, ‘every right to develop 
their own relationships with management in collective bargaining’.212 
In 1949 a new constitution, the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) was completed. It 
echoed the basic settlement of the Weimar constitution, especially in article 14(2) 
where it was written again that ‘Property carries responsibility’. There was no 
explicit right to codetermination, but instead the principle became implicit in the 
constitution’s central scheme. Weimar’s principles were not torn up, as they had 
been by the Reichsarbeitsgericht and the Nazis, but were entrenched in article 20, 
which provided that the new Republic was a ‘social state’ and article 79(3) which 
provided that any attempt to amend this constitutional principle would itself be 
unconstitutional.213 A new government was elected, with the Christian Democrat 
Union led by Konrad Adenauer gaining a majority, and a new Deutsche 
Gewerkschaftsbund (German Trade Union Federation) was formed, with Hans 
Böckler becoming the new executive. As the constitution reflected, there was 
essential, cross-political agreement on the principle of codetermination, not least 
since the German Catholic Social Conference in 1949 had supported its 
introduction, and so did the CDU faction in Parliament.214  
But by late 1950, employer interests were regrouping and the bargaining 
power of business was growing. The second of the ‘Goldilocks conditions’ was as 
strong as ever: the labour movement was united. But the first, of equal bargaining 
power, was on the wane, simply as a product of business’ economic resurgence. 
When the Economics Minister, Ludwig Erhard, asserted that the collective 
agreements in the coal and steel industry had no legal status in German law, the 
                                                     
210 Note also, Bremen: Ausführungsgesetz zu Art. 47 der Landesverfassung der Freien Hansestadt 
Bremen vom 10.1.1949 S.7 (BrBRG) without a provision on board involvement. Subsequent laws include 
Bayern Betriebsrätegesetz vom 15.11.1950, mirroring the Bayern Verfassung art 175. Schleswig-Holstein 
Betriebsrätegesetz vom 3.5.1950. H Wachenheim, ‘German Labor asks Co-management’ (1952) 31 
Foreign Affairs 310, counted 11 state laws by that time. 
211 See also I Turner, ‘Codetermination in British-Occupied Germany 1945-1949’ in International Handbook 
of Participation in Organizations (OUP 1989) vol 1, ch 5, 67-8, General Robertson, the leading figure in the 
Control Commission, said the proposal [by French and Soviets for works council representation on 
supervisory boards] would ‘constitute an unwarranted interference on the part of the works council in the 
management of an enterprise’. 
212 Military Government of Germany, Manpower, Trade Unions and Working Conditions: Monthly Report of 
Military Governor U.S. Zone (March 1947 - February 1948) No. 32, 18. 
213 This view, as with many matters of constitutional interpretation, essentially divides authors who 
believe that the principle of codetermination is more or less important.  
214 Bundestag Drucksache I/117. 
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Metalworkers union saw no choice but to ballot for strike action.215 It was clear 
that positive government action was necessary, not to introduce, but to undo 
codetermination.216 Adenauer initially claimed that the use of a strike would be 
unconstitutional against a democratic government,217 a view which Böckler flatly 
refuted. But in any case Adenauer quickly took up negotiations with the DGB and 
conceded that a law should be passed. The result was that the Montan-
Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1951 (Mining Codetermination Act 1951) codified the 
collective bargains for corporate participation in mining that had already been 
won.218 It applied to workplaces with over 1000 staff members, which at the time 
meant around 105 firms.219 
While the first codetermination law was in place, was it possible to spread it 
further? The objective of the DGB, according to its May 1950 platform, was 
precisely this, by any means, in collective agreements or in law, with parity board 
codetermination across industry.220 Of course, Eastern Germany was shut off in 
the Soviet zone. Not surprisingly, in retrospect, it was there that codetermination 
was suppressed the most. In 1947, Brigadier General Smirnow had declared ‘the 
manager’s right to exercise undivided control over the plant’ and ‘freedom from 
petty tutelage by works councils’.221 After all, an unfettered right to manage was 
wholly consistent with Soviet despotism. Like the Nazis, it packed and dominated 
the unions.222 The only contrast was propaganda. This required the Constitution 
of 1949 to proclaim in article 17, that production would be authoritatively 
codetermined by work councils and unions.223 And naturally that was a lie.  
Back in the West, employers and politicians were at a broad consensus about 
worker participation: there was not serious opposition yet, and ‘no astute political 
candidate [could] afford to oppose it’.224 More examples of codetermination, going 
beyond any legal requirement, included the railways in the French zone, copper-
                                                     
215  WH McPherson, ‘Codetermination: Germany’ Move toward a New Economy’ (1951) 5(1) Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 20, 24-25. 
216 cf PSJC, ‘Managerial Revolution in Western Germany: An Experiment in Co-Determination’ (1951) 
7(6) World Today 249, 254. 
217 Control Commission for Germany (British Element), Report for the Quarter 1st October - 31st December, 
1950, 105. 
218 Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsräten und Vorständen der Unternehmen des 
Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie (21 May 1951) BGBl I S. 347. 
219 Biedenkopf Kommission, Bericht der Sachverständigenkommission der Bundesregierung: Mitbestimmung in 
Unternehmen (1970) 11. Bundestag Drucksache VI/334. 
220  Gesetzvorschlag der Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes für das Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Zur Neuordnung 
der Deutschen Wirtschaft (May 1950) summarised by Kerr (1954) 68(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics 535, 
552. 
221 CE Shaw, ‘Management-Labor Committees’ (1950) 3(2) Industrial and Labor Relations Review 229 
222  cf Betriebs-Berater (1948) 472. Note that the author here had not yet appreciated the nature of Soviet 
dictatorship.  
223 Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom 7.10.1949 GBl. DDR 1949 S. 6. 
224 CE Shaw, ‘Management-Labor Committees’ (1950) 3(2) Industrial and Labor Relations Review 229, 
231. 
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smelting Kupferhu tte in Duisburg, or the engineering firm Carl Zeiss in Jena.225 
The DGB’s next goals for collective bargains were federal railways and the whole 
chemical sector. However, Adenauer’s government was reliant on the Free 
Democrat Party, which was contending that state legislation would be unlawful 
while the Federal government considered a general law.226 Continuing the 
collective agreements in steel and mining was one thing, but introducing 
codetermination in other sectors, where unions were weakening in relative terms, 
was apparently different.227 The result was that the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1952 
(Work Constitution Act 1952) introduced a right to one third of the supervisory 
board to be employee representatives, and work councils became compulsory,228 
but all against the votes of the SPD. They resisted because they saw it as a defeat, 
and strongly objected to particular features, continued from 1920, such as separate 
voting blocks within work councils for blue and white collar workers.  
Perhaps the most significant fact about the 1952 Act was that, if they had to 
have it, business interests could argue that neither state legislation, nor collective 
agreement could improve upon its provisions. This was precisely the line adopted 
as the old forces of reaction re-grouped. Alfred Hueck, who had successfully been 
‘de-Nazified’ (Entnazifiziert) in 1949, but remained an influential company lawyer, 
contended that the 1952 Act imposed binding standards when it came to board 
representation.229 Apparently, this argument worked on the ground that the 
relevant constitutional provisions in the Aktiengesetz 1937 regarding the general 
meeting and board were compulsory.230 So, the 1952 Act did not create minimum 
standards, but was final. This was plainly a false assessment then,231 and it is 
plainly is now: any agreement can be reached with those who will make the 
necessary changes in the corporate structure.232 But just enough academic doubt 
could be raised to dampen union hopes of trying. Hueck’s views were significant 
at the time because he was a close colleague of Hans Carl Nipperdey, who in 1954 
was appointed as Bundesarbeitsgericht president. Nipperdey was a complicated figure, 
or possibly just a banal one, but like Hueck he was clearly implicated in 
legitimising fascist human rights abuse.233 After the War he had joined the SPD, 
                                                     
225 Betriebs-Berater (1948) 76 on French zone rail. W Cartellieri, ‘Die Vorschläge der Duisburger 
Kupferhütte zum Mitbestimmungsrecht’ (30 April 1950) Betriebs-Berater 295.  
226 e.g. P Fisher, ‘Works Councils in Germany’ (March 1951) 41. 
227 Kerr (1954) 68(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics 535, 557. 
228 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1952 BGBl I S. 681. 
229 A Hueck, ‘Die Beteiligung der Arbeitnehmer am Aufsichtsrat nach dem Betriebsverfassungsgesetz’ (17 
Sep 1952) Der Betrieb 781 and A Hueck, ‘Erweiterung des Mitbestimmungsrechtes durch Tarifvertrag’ 
(30 November 1952) Betriebs-Berater 925, 928. 
230 Aktiengesetz 1937 §87. He also refers to the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1952 §77. 
231 cf B Walter, ‘Betriebsverfassungsgesetz und tarifliche Praxis’ (1953) Betriebs-Berater 89 and compare 
G Müller, ‘Gegenstand und Verwirklichung des betriebsverfassungsrechtlichen Mitbestimmungs- und 
Mitwirkungsrechts in personellen Angelegenheiten’ (1969) Recht der Arbeit 227. Müller’s argument, to 
the extent that it prevaricates, is also highly flawed. 
232 W Däubler, Tarifvertragsgesetz (3rd edn 2012) §1, rn 906 ff. Securing agreement from directors and the 
shareholder majority will be more practicable in cases where shareholder votes are concentrated. In 
Germany today, this essentially means securing the votes of the banks.  
233 One of Nipperdey’s lasting contributions to labour law has been the horizontal application of human 
rights. He had supported Hans Kelsen against expulsion from Cologne University, but was also a 
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and managed to reinvent himself as a friend of labour. But then, the view that law 
and economics literature has developed – that codetermination only arose through 
law – was almost entirely upside-down. At every point, in 1933, from 1946, and 
after 1954 with enough uncertainty in judicial policy, it was always law that was 
necessary to abolish, suppress and contain codetermination, while collective 
bargaining had made it.  
In this uneasy political balance, two more major codetermination Acts soon 
passed. First, civil servants acquired slightly more limited rights in the 
Bundespersonalvertretungsgesetz 1955 (Federal Staff Representation Act 1955). Second, 
for the mining industries anti-avoidance measures were introduced. Firms subject 
to the 1951 Act had launched a series of mergers and restructurings. The 
Mitbestimmungsergänzungsgesetz 1956 (Codetermination Supplement Act 1956) 
ensured that in subsidiary companies, which were dominated by a parent, 
employees were still able to vote for the supervisory board of the parent.234 In 
total, the DGB viewed the immediate post-war pattern of codetermination as a 
disappointment compared to higher hopes. Nevertheless, the basis for a different 
kind of economic constitution had emerged.235  
 
(5) MODERNISING CODETERMINATION? 
 
The codetermination laws remained settled until the first SPD government was 
elected in 1969. Already in 1966, the late CDU Chancellor had formed an 
investigative commission, chaired by Kurt Biedenkopf, on codetermination 
reform. It reported under the new Chancellor, Willy Brandt, in 1970. The most 
important element was its recommendation for ‘more employee representatives on 
the supervisory board [...] with the proviso that shareholder representatives retain 
a slight majority’.236 The report therefore represented a cross party commitment to 
codetermination, but still on a very specific model. The place of labour 
representation on the supervisory board had two essential consequences. First, 
                                                                                                                                       
member of the Akademie für Deutsches Recht since its founding in 1933, and he expounded Nazi labour law 
through subsequent editions of his commentaries, up to A Hueck, HC Nipperdey and R Dietz, Gesetz zur 
Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit, Kommentar (4th edn 1943). Just one early example of his unemotional assent to 
human rights violations is his academic approval in RAG 21:191, for a case where an officer of a 
dissolved trade union was dismissed without notice because otherwise the Nazis could not realise their 
goals, RAG 44/34 (4 July 1934) 21:188-191 No. 37. 
234 Mitbestimmungsergängungsgesetz 1956 BGBl I 707. See also, the Novelle zur Sicherung der 
Mitbestimmung in Konzernobergesellschaften des Montan-Bereichs 1965, BGBl. I S. 1185; the 
Mitbestimmungsänderungsgesetz zur befristeten Sicherung der Mitbestimmung in Montan-Unternehmen 
1967, BGBl. I S. 1857; and the Mitbestimmungsfortgeltungsgesetz zur befristeten Sicherung der 
Mitbestimmung in Montan-Unternehmen 1971 BGBl. I S. 1857. The effect of these laws, which were  
primarily reactions to developments at Mannesmann and Rheinstahl, was to retain codetermination 
among different group structures and where companies changed production from mining and steel. 
235 A Schuchman, ‘Economic Rationale of Codetermination’ (1957) 10(2) Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 270-283. 
236 Biedenkopf Kommission, Bericht der Sachverständigenkommission der Bundesregierung: Mitbestimmung in 
Unternehmen (1970) 96. Bundestag Drucksache VI/334. 
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because employee voice was not on the executive, the actual determination of the 
essential direction of a company, and its primary distributive functions (including, 
for example, signing collective agreements) was shareholder – or more accurately 
bank237 – dominated. A ‘slight majority’ on the supervisory board would translate 
into full control when the executive was selected. Any description of German 
codetermination as involving ‘parity’ was simply misleading. Second, because 
employee voice was not in the general meeting, it was far less likely that coalitions 
among workers and shareholders would be formed, even if shares represented the 
capital investment of workers.  
This model, however, had settled for the time being into consensus. The 
Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976 (Codetermination Act 1976) was approved by all major 
parties, though the influence of the Free Democratic Party, with whom the SPD 
had a coalition government, was noticeable. After two decades of experience, the 
FDP was now in favour of codetermination, but insisted that employees, rather 
than trade unions on workers’ behalf, had the right to vote for the employee 
representatives on the supervisory board. The compromise reached was that in 
firms with over 2000 employees, employees had a direct vote but could opt to 
delegate it to their union, and in those with over 8000 it would be delegated by 
default but employees could opt to exercise the vote themselves.238 The chairman 
of the supervisory board would be appointed by both shareholder votes (again, 
invariably banks), and employees. If they could not agree after mediation, the 
shareholder votes could force through a candidate.239 The executive should be 
appointed by a two-thirds majority, but the supervisory board chair had a casting 
vote to break any deadlock. Thus the only executive member really representative 
of labour would be one ‘Staff Director’.240  
Despite basic political consensus, Germany’s largest banks and corporations 
claimed the 1976 Act was an unconstitutional violation of the right to property, 
business freedom and freedom of association.241 The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(Federal Constitutional Court) rejected the appeal for the key reason that the 
greater social relevance and use that property had, the more competence the 
legislature had to regulate its use.242 Following the German tradition the judgment 
                                                     
237 Under the Aktiengesetz 1965 §135 banks are entitled to appropriate the votes of those who buy 
shares. See F Kübler, ‘Comment: On Mark Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities 
Markets’ (1998-1999) 5 Columbia Journal European Law 213. This system was abolished recently in 
Switzerland by the Eidgenössische Volksinitiative «gegen die Abzockerei» of 2013, which required 
director remuneration committees to be elected by shareholders, that banks could no longer vote, and 
that pension funds had to exercise their votes. 
238 Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976 (4 May 1976) BGBl. I S. 1153, §9. See W Streeck, ‘Codetermination: The 
Fourth Decade’ in B Wilpert and A Sorge (eds) International Perspectives on Organizational Democracy (John 
Wiley 1984). 
239 Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976 §§27 and 29. 
240 Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976 §§31 and 33. 
241 According to the Grundgesetz 1949 arts 14, 12 and 9. 
242 Bundesverfassungsgericht (1 March 1979) BVerfGE 50, 290, 315-6, after referring to the protection to 
individual property, ‘Dagegen ist die Befugnis des Gesetzgebers zur Inhaltsbestimmung und 
Schrankenbestimmung um so weiter, je mehr das Eigentumsobjekt in einem sozialen Bezug und einer 
sozialen Funktion steht.’ This appears to echo AA Berle, ‘Property, Production and Revolution’ (1965) 
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was written collectively, and an introductory obiter dicta indicated that some 
members of the court wished to highlight the law still explicitly gave a ‘slight 
predominance’ to shareholder representatives.243 The intended implication may 
well have been that a law requiring a majority of employees would be 
unconstitutional. If so, quite why those who advanced this position believed the 
predominance was only ‘slight’ is even less clear than the reasons they might have 
had for their preferred socio-economic policy.244 It was further held that the 
interference with freedom of business and association was justified, because the 
actions of the enterprise were unconstrained, and the enterprise could not in any 
case be equated with shareholders.245  
Since 1979, the legitimacy of employee participation in German corporate 
governance was not seriously questioned. In developing the case law, some of the 
old themes from Weimar re-emerged, though a different judicial ethic was 
apparent. For example, it was held to be lawful for the supervisory board to 
transfer functions to sub-committees and that a requirement of equal 
representation did not extend to every aspect of work.246 However, transfers on 
crucial questions, such as setting director pay, were not lawful,247 and systematic 
exclusion of employees from all affairs was also unlawful.248 Under an SPD-Green 
coalition, a new Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz 2004 (One Third Participation Act 2004) 
recast the rules for companies between 500 and 2000 staff without major changes. 
Codetermination laws were again reviewed by a new commission, chaired once 
more by Biedenkopf. It came to no firm conclusions because employer and 
employee representatives disagreed.249 There were still textbooks, for example 
Christine Windbichler’s, which chose to describe German codetermination as an 
‘unusual, yet less important way to integrate worker interests into the purpose of 
firms’.250 However, such observations appeared increasingly curious, as a majority 
of EU countries had legislated for codetermination.251 ‘As a basic principle’, one 
                                                                                                                                       
65(1) Columbia Law Review 1. See also, F Kübler, W Schmidt and S Simitis, Mitbestimmung als 
gesetzgebungspolitische Aufgabe (1978). 
243 BVerfGE 50, 290, 323, referring to a ‘leichtes Übergewicht’. 
244  On a proper interpretation, however, the purpose of that section of the court’s judgment was merely 
to delineate the subject matter of the enquiry, and not to prejudge any future law. 
245 BVerfGE 50, 290, 352-356. 
246 BGHZ 83, 106 (25 February 1982). 
247 BGHZ 89, 48 (14 November 1983). 
248 BGHZ 122, 342 (17 May 1993). 
249  The work of the Biedenkopf Commission 2005 recommended that board sizes might be reduced and 
that strict rules might be deviated from in groups. This is the most obvious result of the European 
Company reincorporations. The German Corporate Governance Code (2010) 4.1.1 squarely places 
codetermination within its natural structure. 
250 C Windbichler, Gesellschaftsrecht (22nd edn 2009) 362. Windbichler’s observations carry especial weight, 
given her considerable practical experience as a shareholder representative on the supervisory board 
between 2001 and 2006 of the former MAN-Roland AG. 
251 For the present position, see http://www.worker-participation.eu/. This shows there was no 
codetermination for 137 million Europeans (Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
UK). There was public sector codetermination for 62.1 million (Greece, Malta, Spain, Portugal). There 
was up to one third codetermination for 87.4 million people (France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
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leading commentary said, ‘the participation of employees in the decisions of 
production or service is today in its essence unchallenged’.252 Codetermination was 
an indelible part of Germany’s legal, economic, and social organisation. Popular 
support was also thorough, as work council elections every four years continued to 
see enviable turnouts of over 70 per cent.253  
The contemporary debate turns not on the substance of codetermination, but 
on its form, particularly with regard to two main developments in EU law. First, 
when the EU introduced a new company type, the Societas Europaea, it became 
possible for the management of a German company to bargain with worker 
representatives to re-incorporate under different rules to the Mitbestimmungsgesetz 
1976, including fewer employee board members, or a single tier board.254 In 
principle the relevant trade union could agree to something worse than it already 
had, or indeed better, though its bargaining power was plainly buffered by the 
requirement that in absence of a settlement, the original member state rules 
applied by default.255 Hypothetically, it was also argued that after two years on 
converting into a Societas Europaea, a company could reincorporate once more 
and maybe avoid codetermination. The Employee Involvement Directive, article 
11 required member states to stop ‘misuse’ of the corporate form, which was very 
likely intended to a prevent such a cynical series of reincorporations. Yet the fact 
that the scope of this provision was not clarified meant proponents of an ‘escape 
from codetermination’ could remain hopeful.  
Second, it has been debated whether EU freedom of establishment allows 
companies formed in countries without codetermination, for instance a UK Ltd, 
to avoid German codetermination laws. This probably depends on how politically 
adventurous the ECJ judiciary might choose to be because it may seem plain that 
the member states’ public policy exceptions would prevent this. Is EU law being 
used as a mechanism of transnational codetermination avoidance?256 Or is there a 
chance for the multi-jurisdictional spread of codetermination?257 Either way, the 
political dangers to codetermination are perceived as real, and before the 2013 
general election this fuelled the call to legislate to extend codetermination to all 
foreign corporate forms operating in Germany.258 The other alternative, it seems 
                                                                                                                                       
Slovakia). Codetermination under one third for existed for 53 million (Bulgaria, Sweden, Poland, 
Finland). It was fixed at one third of boards for 36 million (Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, 
Slovenia). And there was quasi-parity codetermination for the Germans, with 82.5 million people. 
252 Däubler, Kittner, Klebe, Wedde, Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (13th edn 2011) 126. 
253 eg Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, ‘Works Council Elections 2010: High Voter Turnout’ 
(2011) Newsletter in English, recording 79% average turnout in 2010. 
254  Although not easy to follow at times, a critical and comprehensive explanation is given by P Davies, 
‘Workers on the board of the European Company?’ (2003) 32 Industrial Law Journal 75. 
255 Employee Involvement Directive 2001/86/EC arts 4 and 5. 
256 H Eidenmüller, A Engert and L Hornuf, ‘Incorporating Under European Law: The Societas Europaea 
as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage’ (2009) 10 European Business and Organization Law Review 1. 
257 This follows from the ability for foreign workers to have a voice in codetermination elections. See also 
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258 SPD, Das Wir Entscheidet. Das Regierungsprogramm 2013-2017 (2013) 22, as well as calling for the 
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clear, would be for workforces to use collective agreements to extend 
codetermination, wherever the minimum lies. The success of such a strategy 
would seem now to depend most on the relative bargaining power of the parties.  
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Why does codetermination in Germany? The answer has to be that it originated 
with collective agreements, freely negotiated between directors and employees. 
The voluntary foundations of codetermination were evident in 1918 and from 
1945 to 1951. Codetermination was collectively bargained. The codetermination 
bargains forged a social consensus. This consensus was codified into law. The 
historical evidence sits at odds with the view that sees codetermination as a 
product of fiat. To the extent that this narrative has supported a view that worker 
participation in corporate governance is economically inefficient, it must be 
regarded as wrong. On the contrary, codetermination appeared at the critical 
historical moments to resolve a significant market failure: it counteracted the 
inequality of bargaining power between employers and workers.  
It is possible that some readers may respond to the argument here by 
contending that collective agreements are themselves coercive. On this view, the 
right to strike, which ensures collective bargaining is not just collective begging, is 
tantamount to duress because it is like holding an employer to ransom. Unions are 
like cartels, but corporations are just like people. Strikes are coercive, but 
unemployment is natural. The trouble is, this old view always refused to admit the 
economic reality that employers can threaten to inflict economic loss by dismissing 
the workforce, that they usually have more resources to ‘hold out’ in any economic 
conflict,259 and are thus in a position to impose their intentions on workers 
throughout the employment relationship.260 Unequal wealth distribution between 
organisations and individuals produces unequal bargaining power, and this 
significantly imbalances all contract terms,261 including the terms of worker 
                                                                                                                                       
also be extended to companies that are in Germany with a foreign legal form and domicile.’ cf 
CDU/CSU, Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschland: Regierungsprogramm 2013-2017 (2013) 15, ‘For us social 
partnership, collective bargaining and codetermination remain essential foundations of our social market 
economy.’ Also, at 25, expressing a commitment to enacting a ‘Europa-GmbH’ with provisions so that 
‘national rules concerning codetermination... cannot be circumvented’. This proposed law aims to 
clarifying existing law, which does appear to require that codetermination applies to all private economic 
organisations, both German and foreign, operating in Germany. These are enumerated under the 
Codetermination Act 1976 §1, namely public and private companies limited by shares, limited 
partnerships and co-operatives. There is nothing in §1, or elsewhere, to suggest this provision applies 
only to the German forms of those organisations. This is a question of the true construction of the 
statute.  
259 A Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776) Book I, ch 8, §12. 
260 M Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1915, translated 1947) ch I, §16.  
261 This view has now been adopted by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Bürgschaft (19 October 1993) 
BVerfGE 89, 214 = NJW 1994 36, at paras [56]-[59]. 
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participation. These inequalities will damage economic efficiency, because 
unfairness and unjust enrichment undermine the motivation to work.262 Attacks 
on the right to collective bargaining tread blindly down the road to forced labour, 
fascism, and ruin. German history is the tormented witness.  
Beyond the fact that codetermination arose through collective bargains, 
voluntarily agreed, the central fallacy in thinking that codetermination rights are 
akin to fiat is the view that democratic decision making – both in economic 
organisations and in politics – is itself coercive, and thus inferior to markets. On 
this view, markets are to be equated with freedom for everyone to choose, and when 
this is so, the state is thought to be a neutral umpire. In the utopia of a nexus of 
contracts, everyone is equal. But just as the codetermination bargains were made 
when markets had become genuinely more equal, so the democratic change it 
inspired brought a less coercive economy, because people at work were no longer 
subordinated to the Herr im Haus. It would go too far in the other direction to say 
markets operate through no more than ‘blind coercion’,263 but it is true that there 
can be no unified theory of contracts.264 The contract that leads people to join an 
enterprise has always differed in a fundamental respect to the contract for 
exchange of goods. To meet the changing needs, the enterprise will invariably 
retain the power to unilaterally vary the quid pro quo in the relationship over time,265 
while the benefits production are always realised centrally, and then distributed. 
Generally speaking, the best parties to determine the terms of an exchange are 
those privy to an agreement, rather than a court or the state. And indeed, in 
enterprises where the corporate form has the right to direct, and to appropriate 
the benefits of production from capital and labour,266 the best parties to determine 
how wages, dividends or executive pay are distributed will generally be those who 
institute the enterprise by investing their capital and labour.267 When democratic 
laws began to codify codetermination, they codified, not some fake theory, but the 
lessons of experience in how to secure genuine freedom and autonomy in 
association. 
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